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I. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act*
A. FSIA CASES BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) provides the sole basis for subject matter
jurisdiction in any action against a foreign state. 1 In 2007, the Supreme Court of the
United States decided two FSIA-related cases.
In Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations v. City of New York, the Supreme
Court considered whether India and Mongolia enjoyed immunity from declaratory judg-
ment actions initiated by New York City to determine the validity of municipal tax liens
on property owned by the foreign sovereigns and used in part as residences for diplomatic
employees and their families.2 The Supreme Court held that India and Mongolia were
not immune from suit because the "immovable property" exception under Section
* Attorney-Adviser, Officer of the Legal Adviser, United States Department of State. The views
expressed are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Department of State or the United States
Government.
* Individual contributors will be referred to at the discussion of each relevant section.
* Contributed by Jonathan I. Blackman, Parmer and Carmine D. Boccuzzi, Partner at Cleary Gottlieb
Steen & Hamilton LLP in New York, New York, with assistance from Vitali Rosenfeld, Rahul Mukhi, and
Alida Lasker, all associates at the same firm. Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP represents the Republic
of Argentina and the Republic of Congo in several of the reported cases discussed in this Article.
1. See, e.g., Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 691 (2004).
2. Permanent Mission of India to the U.N. v. City of New York, 127 S. Ct. 2352 (2007).
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1605(a)(4) of the FSIA applied.3 The Court rejected the foreign states' contention that
the "immovable property" exception was limited to cases contesting title, ownership, or
possession, and emphasized the plain language of the provision, which refers to cases in
which "rights in" immovable property are "in issue." 4 This broad language, the Court
held, encompasses tax liens because a lien is a non-possessory interest in property that
places "rights in" property "in issue" by inhibiting the right to convey.5
In Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Services, Inc., the Court held that the appellate juris-
dictional bar of 28 U.S.C. Section 1447(d) precluded the Ninth Circuit from reviewing an
order of remand to state court that was based on a finding that the defendant was not a
"foreign state" under Section 1603 of the FSIA.6 Emphasizing the clear language of the
statute, the Court rejected Powerex's argument that Section 1447(d) was inapplicable to
suits removed under the FSIA.7 Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia acknowledged the
possibility that an erroneous remand could deprive a foreign state of a federal forum but
concluded that the issue raised a policy debate not appropriate for consideration by the
Court: "As far as the Third Branch is concerned, what the text of § 1447(d) indisputably
does prevails over what it ought to have done."8
B. FSIA EXCEPTIONS TO SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY FROM JURISDICTION
1. The Waiver Exception
The waiver exception to jurisdictional immunity under the FSIA, Section 1605(a)(1),
provides that a foreign state is not immune from suit where it has "waived its immunity
either explicitly or by implication." 9 In Autotech Technologies LP v. Integral Research & De-
velopment Corp., the Seventh Circuit found an implied waiver of immunity by Integral, a
corporation wholly owned by Belarus. 10 After the parties had settled the original lawsuit,
the district court retained jurisdiction to enforce the settlement and subsequently imposed
monetary contempt sanctions on Integral for noncompliance. Ten years later, the district
court reduced the unpaid sanctions to a money judgment without addressing whether In-
tegral had waived sovereign immunity. 1 On appeal, the Seventh Circuit found that Inte-
gral had implicitly waived immunity, both by agreeing to arbitrate in the United States
under a contract governed by Illinois law and by not raising the immunity defense at the
commencement of proceedings.12
The Fifth Circuit applied the same principles in Af-Cap, Inc. v. Republic of Congo, but
found no implied waiver of jurisdictional immunity by the Republic of Congo. 13 There,
3. Id. at 2358.
4. Id. at 2356.
5. Id.
6. Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Servs., Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2411, 2417 (2007). Section 1447(d) of title 28,
United States Code provides that "[a]n order remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed
is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise."
7. Powerex, 127 S. Ct. at 2419-20.
8. Id. at 2420.
9. 28 U.S.C. §1605(a)(1).
10. Autotech Techs. LP v. Integral Research & Dev. Corp., 499 F.3d 737, 743-44 (7th Cir. 2007).
11. Id. at 742.
12. Id. at 743-44.
13. Af-Cap, Inc. v. Republic of Congo, 462 F.3d 417, 426-27 (5th Cir. 2006).
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the underlying contract did not provide for arbitration but for jurisdiction of courts in
London and New York (not Texas where the district court was located). The contract was
governed by English (and not U.S.) law. Furthermore, the previous proceedings in Af-
Cap, where the waiver exception to immunity from execution had been found to apply, had
concerned garnishment of Congo's intangible property allegedly located in Texas but had
not implicated Congo in personam, and therefore could not affect Congo's jurisdictional
immunity from in personam orders.14
2. The Commercial Activity Exception
a. "Commercial Activity" by a Foreign State
In El-Hadad v. United Arab Emirates, the D.C. Circuit considered an accountant's
wrongful termination suit against his employer, the Embassy of the United Arab Emirates,
and held that the employment relationship constituted a commercial activity.' 5 Guided by
the FSIA's legislative history, the court concluded that, while the commercial activity ex-
ception may not be invoked by civil servants or other state employees performing a
"quintessentially governmental" function, El-Hadad was an accountant engaged in regular
commercial employment.16 Therefore, his employment action was within the commercial
activity exception. 17
In Anglo-Iberia Underwriting Management. Co. v. Lodderhose, the Second Circuit ad-
dressed whether "negligent supervision" of an employee could be deemed a "commercial
activity." 18 The suit was based on a fraud scheme perpetrated by an employee of Jamsos-
tek, an insurance company owned by the Republic of Indonesia. The Second Circuit's
summary order affirmed the dismissal of the breach of contract claims against Jamsostek
and Indonesia because the implicated employee lacked apparent or actual authority, and
his actions therefore could not be imputed to his employers.19 But the court remanded for
further consideration of the plaintiffs' "negligent supervision" claim, which was not based
on agency principles. 20 If negligent supervision of the employee occurred "in connection
with a commercial activity" of Indonesia and caused a "direct effect" in the United States,
the action would be within the purview of the commercial activity exception.
21
b. The "Based Upon" Requirement
The commercial activity exception requires that the plaintiff's action be "based upon" a
foreign state's "commercial activity" or an act in connection with such activity causing a
14. Id. See infra note 46 for further discussion of both Autotecb and Af-Cap in relation to execution
immunity.
15. EI-Hadad v. United Arab Emirates, 496 F.3d 658, 663-68 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
16. Id. at 664.
17. d.at 668.
18. Anglo-Iberia Underwriting Mgmt. Co. v. Lodderhose, 235 Fed. App'x 776, 781-82 (2d Cir. 2007).
19. Id. at 780.
20. Id. at 781-82.
21. Id. at 780.
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"direct effect" in the United States.22 In other words, the plaintiff must show a "signifi-
cant nexus" between its cause of action and the foreign state's commercial conduct.23
In Kensington International Ltd.. v. Itoua, the Second Circuit found that such a nexus was
lacking in a civil RICO action by Kensington, a creditor of the Republic of Congo, against
Congo's national oil company Sociite Nationale des Pftroles du Congo (SNPC), its former
president, Itoua, and the French bank BNP Paribas (BNP).24 Kensington alleged that oil
trading transactions and related financial arrangements by these defendants prevented
Kensington from attaching Congolese oil in satisfaction of its judgments against Congo.
The Second Circuit held that Kensington's RICO action was not "based upon" any con-
duct by the defendants that either took place in the United States or caused a direct effect
in the United States. "The gravamen of Kensington's complaint" was the oil prepayment
agreements between SNPC and BNP, which occurred in Europe or in Africa. 25 The oc-
casional shipments of oil to the United States by BNP or third parties and occasional
payments wired through the New York branch of BNP did not "form the basis of [Ken-
sington's] action" because the oil trading structure "would have the same alleged effect on
Kensington's ability to collect on its debt even if" these events occurred entirely outside
the United States.26 Likewise, Kensington's inability to collect on its U.S. judgment did
not constitute a "direct effect" in the United States because a contrary rule would allow
plaintiffs "to abrogate sovereign immunity regardless of how insubstantial the connection
was between the acts underlying that judgment and the United States. '27
On the other hand, in Boeing Co. v. EgyptAir, the Second Circuit found the "significant
nexus" requirement satisfied.28 Boeing, a named assured under EgyptAir's insurance pol-
icy, sought a declaratory judgment that Misr, an insurance company wholly owned by
Egypt, could not recover from Boeing for damages it had paid in connection with an
EgyptAir plane crash. In a summary order, the Second Circuit held that naming Boeing
as an additional assured was an "act" in connection with Misr's commercial activity outside
the United States that had a "direct effect" in the United States by allowing EgyptAir to
fly in and out of this country.2 9 Since Boeing's claim for declaratory relief was "based
upon" that same act, which precluded Misr from recovering against Boeing, the court
found it to be well within the commercial activity exception. 30
In Orient Mineral Co. v. Bank of China, the Tenth Circuit also addressed the nexus re-
quirement. 31 The plaintiff, Orient Mineral Company (Orient), had formed a joint venture
with an individual who opened an account at the Bank of China (Bank) on Orient's behalf,
22. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2).
23. See Reiss v. Socilt6 Centrale du Groupe des Assurances Nationales, 235 F.3d 738, 747 (2d Cir. 2000);
see also Garb v. Republic of Poland, 440 F.3d 579, 586 (2d Cir. 2006) ("As a threshold step in assessing
plaintiffs' reliance on the 'commercial activity' exception, we must identify the act of the foreign sovereign
State that serves as the basis for plaintiffs' claims.").
24. Kensington Int'l Ltd. v. Itoua, 505 F.3d 147, 156 (2d Cir. Oct. 18, 2007).
25. Id.
26. Id. at 156-57.
27. Id. at 159.




31. Orient Mineral Co. v. Bank of China, 506 F.3d 980, 993-1000 (10th Cir. Oct. 24, 2007).
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and who later allegedly embezzled money from the account, including a sum wired to his
wife's account in Utah. Orient sued the Bank on the theory that it had breached the duty
to safeguard Orient's funds, arguing that the claims were "based upon" the Bank's com-
mercial conduct with a nexus to the United States. The court held that there was no
jurisdiction over most of Orient's claims because the "ongoing business relationship" be-
tween Orient and the Bank was in China, and those claims had no connection to the
Bank's unrelated commercial presence in the United States. 32 Nevertheless, with respect
to the wire transfer to the account in Utah, the court held that the Bank had engaged in
commercial activity that caused a "direct effect" in the United States. 33
c. "Direct Effect in the United States"
In American Telecom Co., L.L.C. v. Republic of Lebanon, the Sixth Circuit held that a for-
eign state's act of excluding a U.S. company from bidding on a contract did not constitute
a "direct effect" in the United States. 34 American Telecom paid for the right to bid on a
contract in Lebanon but was subsequently disqualified because it had submitted an e-mail
copy of its tender bond and not the original document. On appeal from the dismissal of
American Telecom's suit on sovereign immunity grounds, the Sixth Circuit applied the
principle that an "effect is direct if it follows as an immediate consequence of the defen-
dant's activity" and held that the only immediate consequence of Lebanon's act was to
disqualify American Telecom from the bidding in Lebanon. 35 American Telecom's pay-
ment for the right to enter the bidding (drawn from a U.S. bank account) was voluntary
and not an "effect" of Lebanon's conduct. Accordingly, the alleged breaches by Lebanon
did not "cause a direct effect in the United States," and Lebanon was entitled to
immunity. 36
3. The Expropriation Exception
In Nemariam v. Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, the D.C. Circuit addressed claims
against Ethiopia and its Central Bank (CBE) for allegedly unlawful takings of bank ac-
counts. 37 The court held that, although "rights in property" under Section 1605(a)(3)
included intangible property, the expropriation exception was inapplicable because the
bank accounts at issue were not owned or operated by CBE.3s The court reasoned that
the property right at issue was the plaintiff's "contractual right to receive payment," and
that CBE had not taken possession of that right-"instead it declined to perform its own
contractual obligations." 39
32. Id. at 993-96.
33. Id. at 996.
34. American Telecom Co., L.L.C., v. Republic of Lebanon, 501 F.3d 534, 541 (6th Cir. 2007).
35. Id. at 540 (quoting Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 618 (1992)) (internal quota-
tions omitted).
36. Id. at 541.
37. Nemariam v. Fed. Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 491 F.3d 470 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
38. Id. at 481.
39. Id.
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C. FSIA EXCEPTIONS TO SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY FROM EXECUTION
1. Scope and Effect of a Waiver of Immunity from Execution
In Af-Cap Inc. v. Chevron Oversees (Congo) Ltd., the Ninth Circuit considered whether
the Republic of Congo's contractual waiver of immunity from execution allowed Congo's
judgment creditor to attach various obligations owed to Congo by ChevronTexaco in con-
nection with petroleum operations in Congolese territory.40 The Court of Appeals held
that, even with the waiver, the only property of Congo amenable to execution would be its
property both "in the United States" and "used for commercial activity in the United
States." 41 Finding that ChevronTexaco's obligations to Congo were not used for a com-
mercial activity in the United States, the court dissolved the garnishments and liens.42
In holding that no waiver can dispense with the statutory limitations imposed by the
FSIA, the Ninth Circuit joined other circuit courts that have likewise interpreted Section
1610(a)(1) of the FSIA according to its plain meaning.43 In Autotecb, the Seventh Circuit
also concluded that, even if the defendant's jurisdictional waiver encompassed execution
immunity, the scope of property amenable to execution was still limited by the language of
the statute.44 Autotech's writ of execution was unenforceable under Section 1610 because
the writ did not identify any specific property, making it impossible to ascertain whether
the property subject to execution would be "in the United States" and "used for commer-
cial activity in the United States." 45 In the words of the Seventh Circuit, "[a] court cannot
give a party a blank check when a foreign sovereign is involved." 46
2. Property of a Foreign State v. Property of an Agency or Instrumentality of a Foreign
State
Although an "agency or instrumentality of a foreign state" is included within the defini-
tion of a "foreign state" under Section 1603 of the FSIA, a foreign state itself and its
agencies or instrumentalities are treated very differently for execution purposes. 4 7 In Min-
istry of Defense and Support for the Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran v. Cubic Defense
Systems, Inc., the Ninth Circuit addressed whether the Ministry of Defense of Iran
(MOD), for purposes of execution immunity, was an agency or instrumentality of Iran, or
40. Af-Cap Inc. v. Chevron Overseas (Congo) Ltd., 475 F.3d 1080 (9th Cit. 2007).
41. Id. at 1087.
42. See discussion infra Part I.C.2.
43. See, e.g., Kensington Int'l Ltd. v. Republic of Congo, 461 F.3d 238, 243 (2d Cit. 2006) ("even with a
waiver, the district court's authority is still limited" by the language of subsections 16 10 (a)(1) and 1610(d)(1)
of the FSIA); FG Hemisphere Assocs. v. Republique du Congo, 455 F.3d 575,588-590 (5th Cir. 2006) (courts
must determine whether a foreign state's property is "in the United States" and "used for commercial activity
in the United States" every time execution on foreign state property is sought).
44. Autotech, 499 F.3d at 749-51, discussed supra Part I.B.1.
45. Id. at 750.
46. Id. The Seventh Circuit, however, opined that the FSIA does not categorically prohibit the imposition
of monetary contempt sanctions against a foreign state, attempting to distinguish, without significant analysis,
the Fifth Circuit's recent holding that the FSIA bars such sanctions because they are not contemplated by
§§ 1610-11. Compare Autotech, 499 F.3d at 745 (7th Cir.), with Af-Cap, 462 F.3d at 428-29 (5th Cir.).
47. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a) with § 1610(b).
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a part of the state itself.48 Plaintiff Elahi, in order to satisfy a wrongful death judgment
against Iran resulting from a terrorist act, sought to attach an arbitral award owed to
MOD by Cubic Defense Systems. His ability to do so turned on whether MOD was "a
separate legal person" within the meaning of Section 1603(b) because, if it were, its prop-
erty would be subject to the broader set of exceptions to immunity from execution that
apply to agencies and instrumentalities under Section 1610(b).49 The Ninth Circuit
adopted a "'core functions' test, asking whether the defendant is 'an integral part of a
foreign state's political structure' or, by contrast, 'an entity whose structure and function is
predominantly commercial." 50 While declining to state a categorical rule on the subject,
the court subscribed to "a strong presumption that the armed forces constitute a part of
the foreign state itself" and, because that "presumption has not been rebutted here," the
court concluded that MOD was a part of the state. 5 1
3. Property "Used for a Commercial Activity in the United States"
In EM Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, the Second Circuit addressed the attempt by plain-
tiffs, holders of Argentine-issued debt, to attach an account of Argentina's central bank at
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY).52 The district court rejected the argu-
ment that the Republic had obtained an attachable interest in the funds based upon two
decrees issued by the Argentine President in late 2005, which authorized the central bank
to use its reserves to repay the Republic's debts to the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
without specifically designating the FRBNY funds for that use.5 3
In affirming the vacatur of the attachment, the Second Circuit held that, even if the
decrees had converted the FRBNY funds into property of the Republic, repaying the IMF
is not a "commercial activity," and that, in any event, plaintiffs had failed to show that any
of the FRBNY funds were to be "used for" making such payments.5 4 The Second Circuit
observed that the Republic's relationship with the IMF was pursuant to powers "peculiar
to sovereigns" because only sovereign nation states can become members and borrowers
of the IMF, and the IMF program is part of an enterprise intended to promote stability in
the international monetary system and foster orderly economic growth.5 5
48. Ministry of Def. & Support for the Armed Forced of the Islamic Republic of Iran v. Cubic Def. Sys.
Inc., 495 F.3d 1024, 1034-37 (9th Cir. 2007).
49. Id. at 1034; 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b). The Ninth Circuit held that Elahi could attach the Cubic award under
the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA) and reached the question of MOD's status under the FSIA only to
the extent that its analysis of TRIA might be incorrect.
50. Cubic, 495 F.3d at 1034 (quoting Transaero, Inc. v. La Fuerza Aerea Boliviana, 30 F.3d 148, 151 (D.C.
Cir. 1994)).
51. Id. at 1035, 1036-37. See discussion infra Part I.C.3.
52. EM Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 473 F.3d 463 (2d Cir. 2007).
53. Id. at 470.
54. Id. at 484. The Republic's ability to exert some control over its central bank, as reflected in the decrees,
did not mean that the ownership of the FRBNY funds had changed hands to the Republic. "To conclude
otherwise would be to allow creditors of a foreign state to attach all of the assets of the state's central bank any
time the foreign state issues directives affecting the central bank's reserves." Id. at 475. The Second Circuit
further noted that, even if the Republic had an attachable interest in the FRBNY account, the funds would
likely be immune from attachment by the separate protection given to central bank assets under § 1611 of the
FSIA, which immunizes property of a foreign central bank "held for its own account." Id. at 485; 28 U.S.C.
§ 1611(b)(1).
55. EM, 473 F.3d at 482-83.
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In both Af-Cap and Cubic, the Ninth Circuit also considered the question of whether
property was "used for a commercial activity in the United States," as required by Section
1610(a).56 In Af-Cap, the plaintiff urged the court to adopt a broad reading of "used for"
that would encompass the "entire underlying activity that generated the property in ques-
tion."57 The Ninth Circuit disagreed, holding that "property is 'used for a commercial
activity in the United States' when the property in question is put into action, put into
service, availed or employed for a commercial activity" as opposed to "in connection with a
commercial activity or in relation to a commercial activity."58 Under this interpretation,
the Ninth Circuit held that none of the obligations owed to Congo was "used for com-
mercial activity in the United States."59 Similarly, in Cubic, the Ninth Circuit held that
the arbitral award that MOD intended to send to Iran for "repatriation into a ministry's
budget" was not being "used for a commercial activity in the United States." 60
II. Service of Process Abroad*
A. INTRODUCTION
Service of process upon an individual in a foreign country in civil actions brought in
U.S. federal courts is governed by Rule 4(f of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The
Supreme Court has held that when service of process is to be made in a foreign country
that is a signatory to the Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extra-
judicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters (Hague Convention), Rule 4() re-
quires that the Hague Convention's provisions are the exclusive means to effect service of
process. 61 Additionally, Rule 4(0(3) allows for service "by other means not prohibited by
international agreement, as the court orders."62 In 2007, the language of Rule 4 was
amended for stylistic purposes only63 and the federal courts wrestled with the question of
whether the Hague Convention authorizes service of process through registered interna-
tional mail and what possible alternate means of service of process are allowable under
Rule 4(0(3).
B. DEVELOPMENTS UNDER THE HAGUE CONVENTION
Although the Hague Convention outlines several possible methods in which service of
process can be performed (for example, through a foreign country's central authority), the
56. Af-Cap, 475 F.3d 1080; Cubic, 495 F.3d 1024 (discussed supra Parts I.C.1 and I.C.2 respectively).
57. Af-Cap, 475 F.3d at 1087.
58. Id. at 1091 (emphasis in original) (citing Conn. Bank of Commerce v. Republic of Congo, 309 F.3d 240
(5th Cir. 2002)).
59. Id. at 1092-96.
60. Cubic, 495 F.3d at 1037 (discussed supra Part I.C.2).
* Contributed by William Lawrence, parmer at Frommer Lawrence & Haug, L.L.P. in New York, New
York. Special thanks to Rami Bardenstein, an associate with Frommer Lawrence & Haug, L.L.P., for his
research assistance.
61. See Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694, 699 (1988).
62. Fed. R Civ. P. 4(0(3).
63. Amendments to Rule 4 became effective on December 1, 2007. A Committee note on the approved
changes recognized that the language of Rule 4 was amended as a part of the general restyling of the Civil
Rules and was done to make the rules more easily understood.
VOL. 42, NO. 2
INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION 423
Hague Convention's Article 10(a) has generated some recent federal court discussion. Ar-
ticle 10(a) states that as long as the foreign state "does not object, the present Convention
shall not interfere with (a) the freedom to send judicial documents, by postal channels,
directly to persons abroad."64 Controversy continues to surround the term "send." Fed-
eral courts have split on the whether the term "send" means "serve" and therefore allows
for service of process via certified mail. 65
In 2007, one district court in the Sixth Circuit adopted the Fifth and Eight Circuits'
interpretations of Article 10(a) as not permitting service via registered mail.66 The East-
ern District of Tennessee in Haun v. HTC, Inc. concluded that service via registered mail
to a Swedish defendant was improper because "'send' in Article 10(a) is not equivalent to
'service of process.'"67 The Haun court relied on prior district court decisions from the
Sixth Circuit in support of its holding.6s Although the Haun decision does not contain
any reasoned analysis of Article 10(a), when read in context with other 2007 federal dis-
trict court decisions, this case highlights the division amongst courts on the broad issue of
whether Article 10(a) permits service via registered mail or not.
In Barnhill v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., the Southern District of Alabama also dealt
with the issue of whether to interpret "send" in Article 10(a) as permitting service via
certified mail and reached the opposite conclusion. 69 In Barnhill, the plaintiff notified
Teva, an Israeli defendant, of the action by mailing a copy of the summons and complaint
by international certified mail to Israel, a signatory of the Hague Convention without
objection to Article 10(a). In reaching its decision, the Barnhill court found the Second
and Ninth Circuits' reasoning in interpreting the term "send" in Article 10(a) more per-
suasive than that of the Fifth and Eight Circuits. This broader interpretation, according
to the court, was more aligned with the Hague Convention's purpose, which facilitates
service of process.70 Recognizing that the Second and Ninth Circuit's interpretation "was
also the understanding of parties [to the Hague Convention] . . . and the view of the
United States State Department," the district court held that Article 10(a) permits service
by mail. 7" As a result, the Barnhill court held that the plaintiff's service of process was
sufficient.72
The Eastern District of Wisconsin in Koss Corp. v. Pilot Air Freight Corp., provided a
more nuanced interpretation of whether Article 10(a) permits service of process abroad by
64. Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Com-
mercial Matters art. 10(a), Nov. 15, 1965, T.I.A.S. No. 6638, 4 I.L.M. 341.
65. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Theriault, 516 F. Supp. 2d 450, 453 (E.D. PA. Oct. 12, 2007); Koss Corp. v. Pilot
Air Freight Corp., 242 F.R.D. 514, 516 (E.D. Wis. 2007); Barnhill v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., No.
06-0282-CB-M, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44771, *15 (S.D. Ala. Apr. 24, 2007).
66. Haun v. HTC, Inc., No. 3:07 Civ. 180, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69495 (E.D. Tenn. Sept. 19, 2007).
Also upholding service of process via registered mail under Article 10(a) was the district court in Guy Carpen-
ter & Co., LLC v. Samengo-Turner, No. 07 Civ. 3580, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42730 at *7 (S.D.NY. June
14, 2007) (finding service effective because the United Kingdom (where the defendants resided) has not
objected to Article 10(a), and registered mail is an acceptable method of service of process).
67. Id. at *4.
68. Id.
69. See, Barnhill, No. 06-0282-CB-M, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44771 (S.D. Ala. April 24, 2007).




424 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
registered mail. 73 In Koss, the defendant, Pilot Air Freight, attempted to effect service of
process on Posten, a third-party Swedish company, via international registered mail in
Sweden. In concluding that the Hague Convention does not prevent service via interna-
tional mail, the Koss court relied on two principal findings similar to those in Barnhill.
First, the court found that the Hague Convention "is dedicated solely to service of pro-
cess," and therefore "it would be incongruous for a subsection of Article 10(a) to refer to
something other than service of process." 74 This conclusion is bolstered by the view of
practically all member countries to the Convention that the term "send" in Article 10(a)
includes serve.75 Second, the court recognized that the United States State Department
"specifically disapproved the Eight[sic] Circuit's" view that "send" does not mean
"serve." 76
Unlike the Barnhill court, however, the Koss court did not find that Article 10(a) ex-
pressly authorizes service of process via registered mail but merely does not interfere with
service of process via international mail. The Koss court found that Rule 4(f)(3) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes service by international mail, but that such
service must be specifically directed by the district court.77 Ultimately, while service in
Barnhill was proper without court authorization, in Koss the defendants were not author-
ized to serve the third-party via international mail. Since Pilot Air Freight was not given
express authorization by the district court for such service, Pilot Air Freight's service was
not valid. 78 Under the circumstances, the district court authorized such service and gave
Pilot Air Freight 120 days to properly effect service. 79
Further highlighting the confusion surrounding Article 10(a)'s contours is Mitchell v.
Theriault.8o Mitchell dealt with two Canadian defendants, residents of Quebec, who were
accused of negligently injuring the plaintiffs in an automobile accident. One defendant
was an individual while the other defendant was a corporation. Recognizing the split
among federal circuits, and even within its own circuit, the district court held that Article
10(a) permits service via registered mail.s1
Similar to the Koss court, however, the Mitchell court found that Article 10(a) permits
but does not expressly authorize service through registered mail.82 The Mitchell court
noted that authorization was possible under three other provisions: Rule 4(f)(2)(c)(ii), Rule
4(0(3), or Rule 4(f)(2)(A). Rule 4(f)(2)(c)(ii) authorizes service by mail if "mailed by the
clerk of the federal district court in which the suit is filed."8 3 Since the Mitchell plaintiffs
mailed the summons and complaint, and not the district court clerk, Rule 4(0(2)(c)(ii) was
clearly not applicable. 84 As was the case in Koss, Rule 4(0(3) was not applicable because it
73. Koss, 242 F.R.D. 514.
74. Id. at 516-517.
75. Id. at 517.
76. Id. Note that Koss, like Haun (discussed above), involved a Swedish defendant. The only distinction
determining whether or not service was proper was the location of the U.S. forum in which the suit was filed.
77. Id. at 518.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Mitchell, No. 3:07-cv-1241, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76684 (E.D. PA. Oct. 12, 2007).
81. Id. at *11.
82. See id. at *11-*12.
83. Id. at *13.
84. Id.
VOL. 42, NO. 2
INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION 425
requires prior authorization from the district court, which the plaintiffs did not receive
prior to service.85 Thus, the court turned to Rule 4(f)(2)(A), which authorizes service "in
the manner prescribed by the law of the foreign country for service in that country in an
action in any of its courts of general jurisdiction."86 After analyzing Canada's law on
service, the court concluded that service via mail was authorized for individuals but not
corporations in Quebec.8 7 And as the Koss court did, the Mitchell court simply quashed
service and allowed the plaintiffs 120 days to effect proper service.88
The Koss an-i Mitchell decisions are of interest for two reasons. First, both courts seem-
ingly agreed with Barnhill that Article 10(a) permits service via registered mail yet found
no express authorization. Second, and more importantly, Mitchell delved much deeper
into Rule 4(f) to find authorization than Koss did.
The decisions of 2007 regarding Article 10(a) demonstrate there are at least four possi-
ble outcomes when a plaintiff attempts to effect service of process via registered mail
abroad, depending on the particular U.S. forum. Courts can find Article 10(a) does not
permit such service (Haun); expressly authorizes service (Barnhill); does not expressly au-
thorize service but requires a court directive to authorize service (Koss, Mitchell); or re-
quires the law of the forum to authorize such service (Mitchell).
C. DEVELOPMENTS UNDER RULE 4 OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
A corollary to the Hague Convention is Rule 4(0(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, which provides for service "by other means not prohibited by international agree-
ment as the court orders."89 As discussed in the Koss case above, means of service under
Rule 4(0(3) must be authorized by a district court before such service can be valid. Two
recent cases highlight the types of alternate means district courts approved in 2007.
In Williams-Sonoma, Inc. v. Friendfinder, Inc., a Northern District of California court
approved Williams-Sonoma's request for service via electronic mail on the defendant in a
trademark infringement suit.90 Williams-Sonoma asserted that it could not effect service
by traditional means because the physical addresses of the named defendants, residents of
various countries such as the Philippines, India, England, and Israel, were incorrect or
because the defendants refused service. 91 Relying on a previous Ninth Circuit holding
that service via electronic mail is permitted so long as it was the most likely means of
reaching the defendant, and on evidence that email accounts were an effective means of
communication between Williams-Sonoma and the defendants, the Williams-Sonoma
court authorized service of process via electronic mail.92
Similarly, in Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Veles Ltd., the Southern District of New York
authorized service of process in a trademark case via electronic mail and facsimile pursuant
85. See id.
86. Id. at *14.
87. Id. at *16-*17.
88. See id. at *21.
89. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(0(3).
90. Williams-Sonoma Inc. v. FriendFinder Inc., No. C 06-06572 JSW, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31299
(N.D. Cal. Apr. 17, 2007).
91. Id. at *2.
92. Id. at *6.
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to Rule 4(0(3).93 In Philip Morris, the plaintiff alleged that the defendants violated plain-
tiffs trademarks by advertising and selling cigarettes bearing the plaintiffs trademarks
through online cigarette stores. Philip Morris sought approval under Rule 4(f)(3) to effect
service of process via electronic mail and facsimile because the defendants were foreign
corporations of unknown citizenship, and no physical addresses were posted on the web-
sites.94 Nor was Philip Morris able to locate any physical addresses valid for completing
service of process.95 The Philip Morris court noted that, although Rule 4(f) permits a wide
range of alternate means, the "court must determine whether the alternate method is rea-
sonably calculated, under all circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency
of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections." 96 The court
recognized that "[flederal courts have traditionally incorporated advances in telecommu-
nications technology to methods of notice giving." 97 Finding that the plaintiff adequately
demonstrated service could not be completed by traditional methods, and that email and




The federal courts continue to reach different results in applying existing precedent
when determining if a federal court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a foreign na-
tional defendant.98 As discussed infra in Part VIII(B), however, a unanimous Supreme
Court resolved a circuit split over "whether a federal court could dismiss under the forum
non conveniens doctrine before definitively ascertaining its own jurisdiction," holding that
a district court may dismiss a case for forum non conveniens before resolving questions of
subject-matter and personal jurisdiction "when considerations of convenience, fairness,
and judicial economy so warrant."99 Yet, because jurisdiction is a threshold consideration,
district courts must continue to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, not for forum non con-
veniens, if the lack of jurisdiction is obvious. 1°°
Concerning the lower courts, there was little breakthrough or pronouncement of clear
precedent that might benefit practitioners. This compilation highlights cases decided in
2007 concerning the reach of personal jurisdiction to foreign national defendants, focus-
ing on three areas: (1) specific personal jurisdiction, (2) foreign products placed into the
93. Philip Morris USA Inc. v. Veles Ltd., No. 06 CV 2988 (GBD), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19780
(S.D.N.Y. March 12, 2007).
94. Id. at *2.
95. Id.
96. Id. at *8-*9.
97. Id. at *8.
* Jarrett B. Perlow, Staff Attorney, United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Services. The views
expressed are those of the author and not necessarily those of the court or the United States Government.
98. See, e.g., O'Connor v. Sandy Lane Hotel Co., Ltd., 496 F.3d 312, 318-24 (3d Cir. 2007) (discussing the
three competing approaches federal and state courts have used to explain the "arise out of or relate to"
standard from Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984), and adopting an
amalgamated standard for the Third Circuit).
99. Sinochem Int'l Co. Ltd., v. Malay. Int'l Shipping Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1184, 1192-93 (2007).
100. Id. at 1194.
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United States's stream of commerce, and (3) enforceability of foreign judgments against
U.S. residents.
B. SPECIFIC JURISDICTION
Two circuit decisions illustrate recent applications of specific jurisdiction. In Sloss Indus-
tries Corp., v. Eurisol, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that a French company's sales rela-
tionship with an Alabama plaintiff constituted sufficient contacts to allow the court to
exercise personal jurisdiction.10 1 In mid-2004, Eurisol, a French corporation, began
purchasing slag wool from Sloss Industries Corporation, an Alabama company.1 2 Sloss
filed suit against Eurisol after Eurisol failed to pay for some shipments; Eurisol did not
enter an appearance, and the district court entered a default judgment for Sloss. 1° 3 After a
jury awarded Sloss damages, Eurisol moved to set aside the judgment for lack of personal
jurisdiction, which was denied, and Eurisol appealed. 104
On appeal the Eleventh Circuit agreed that Eurisol was subject to specific jurisdiction
in Alabama as a result of the sales contracts between the two companies. These contacts
included extensive involvement by Eurisol in and with Sloss in Alabama:
(1) initiating contact with Sloss, (2) having its representatives visit Sloss'[s] manufactur-
ing facilities in Alabama to discuss the production of the slag wool, (3) proposing an exclu-
sive supplier arrangement, and (4) sending shipping containers to Sloss in Alabama for use
in shipping the slag wool to France. 0 5
The court distinguished these contacts from prior non-resident-transaction cases by
noting this case involved ten orders over several months, and Eurisol was extensively in-
volved in the transactions by visiting the plant, 106 assisting with shipping, and proposing
exclusive supplier arrangements. 10 7 The court found that, constitutionally, Eurisol "was
more than a mere passive purchaser" and "purposefully availed itself of the privilege of




105. Id. at 929.
106. Butsee Moncrief Oil Int'l, Inc. v. OAO Gazprom, 481 F.3d 309, 313-14 (5th Cir. 2007) (characterizing
a single visit by defendant to the forum as "fortuitous" because any related business discussions between the
parties were "purely incidental" to the defendant's visit).
107. Sloss Indus. Corp., 488 F.3d at 931, distinguishing Borg-Warner Acceptance Corp. v. Lovett & Tharpe,
Inc., 786 F.2d 1055 (11th Cit. 1986) (holding no personal jurisdiction over out-of-state purchaser when
purchase involved only one transaction), and Banton Indus., Inc. v. Dimatic Die & Tool Co., 801 F.2d 1283
(11th Cir. 1986) (finding no personal jurisdiction over ongoing business relationship with out-of-state pur-
chaser because the purchase at issue was unsolicited from Alabama, the products were delivered outside of
Alabama, and the purchaser never sent representatives to Alabama). The court's distinction of Banton was
limited only to the fact that, unlike in Barton, Eurisol was involved in the shipping process. Sloss Indus. Corp.,
488 F.3d at 932. Instead, the court looked to older precedent that emphasized the out-of-state purchaser's
involvement in the Alabama company's business. Id., comparing to Hazen Research, Inc. v. Omega Minerals,
Inc., 497 F.2d 151, 155-56 (5th Cir. 1974) (noting the "affirmative, purposeful decision to enter [forum] and
conduct business there."), and Sw. Offset, Inc. v. Hudco Publ'g Co., 622 F.2d 149 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding
proper the exercise of personal jurisdiction because most orders were unsolicited, the products were made in
the forum, the forum's law governed the contracts, and payment was received in the forum). The Eleventh
Circuit emphasized that Eurisol's contacts with Alabama "went beyond those" in Hudco Publg. See Sloss Indus.
Corp., 488 F.3d at 932.
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conducting activities in Alabama." 108 Finding that the exercise of specific personal juris-
diction over Eurisol comported with constitutional requirements, the court declined to set
aside the judgment.'0 9
The Third Circuit extended personal jurisdiction in a tort action to a Barbados hotel
that had taken overt actions to solicit and to maintain a business relationship with the
plaintiffs in Pennsylvania, including mailing the plaintiffs newsletters and brochures ad-
vertising spa treatments and engaging with the plaintiffs in numerous phone calls."10 One
of the plaintiffs was injured following a spa treatment, and the plaintiffs sued the hotel for
negligence. The district court dismissed their case for lack of personal jurisdiction.,I
On appeal, the Third Circuit found that the hotel "purposefully availed itself of the
privilege of conducting activities" within Pennsylvania by "deliberately reach[ing] into
Pennsylvania" through the mailing of newsletters to the O'Connors, the mailing of a spa
brochure after they scheduled their vacation, and the contracting for spa services over the
telephone.' 12 Turning to the Helicopteros criterion of whether the claims arose out of at
least one of these contacts, 113 the court considered three standards-(l) the "proximate
cause" or "substantive relevance" test,"14 (2) the "but-for causation" test, l" 5 and (3) the
"substantial connection" or "discernable relationship" test' 6-and continued its practice
of declining to adopt a clear standard." 7
Instead, the court held that "specific jurisdiction requires a closer and more direct casual
connection than that provided by the but-for test.""18 The "casual connection," the court
reasoned, "must be intimate enough to keep the quid pro quo [of specific jurisdiction]
108. Sloss Indus. Corp., 488 F.3d at 933.
109. Id. at 935 (affirming the lower court).
110. Sandy Lane Hotel Co., 496 F.3d at 315-16.
111. Id.; see also O'Connor v. Sandy Lane Hotel Co., No. Civ.A.04-2436, 2005 WL 1463250 (E.D. Pa. June
20, 2005) (reconsideration memorandum & order) (reconsidering and re-granting defendant's motion to
transfer to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York for lack of personal jurisdiction in
Pennsylvania); O'Connor v. Sandy Lane Hotel Co., No. Civ.A.04-2436, 2005 WL 994617 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 28,
2005) (original memorandum & order).
112. Sandy Lane Hotel Co., 496 F.3d at 317-18 (citing Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)).
113. See Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414.
114. Sandy Lane Hotel Co., 496 F.3d at 319 ("[T]his test examines whether any of the defendant's contacts
with the forum are relevant to the merits of the plaintiff's claim.") (citing as an example Mass Sch. of Law at
Andover, Inc. v. Am. Bar Ass'n, 142 F.3d 26, 35 (1st Cir. 1998)).
115. Id. at 319. ("iT]his standard is satisfied when the plaintiff's claim would not have arisen in the absence
of the defendant's contacts.") (citing as an example Schute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 897 F.2d 377, 385-86
(9th Cit. 1990).
116. Id. at 319-20 ("The critical question is whether the tie between the defendant's contacts and the plain-
tiff's claim is close enough to make jurisdiction fair and reasonable.") (citing as examples Shoppers Food
Warehouse v. Moreno, 746 A.2d 320, 335-36 (D.C. 2000), and Chew v. Dietrich, 143 F.3d 24, 29 (2d Cir.
1998)).
117. Id. at 320-21 ("[W]e think it appropriate to continue this Court's established practice and refrain from
adopting a bright-line test. That is not to say, however, that our relatedness inquiry should be completely
devoid of standards.") (internal citation omitted).
118. Id. at 323. ("[Tihe analysis should hew closely to the reciprocity principle upon which specific jurisdic-
tion rests.... The relatedness requirement's function is to maintain balance in this reciprocal exchange. In
order to do so, it must keep the jurisdictional exposure that results from a contact closely tailored to that
contact's accompanying substantive obligations."). Ironically, the court added that, in World-Wide Volk-
swagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980), the Supreme Court advised that the "Due Process
Clause is supposed to bring 'a degree of predictability to the legal system."' Id. (internal citations omitted).
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proportional and ... reasonably foreseeable."ll 9 This meant that the plaintiff would not
have been injured if the hotel had not mailed him a brochure about the spa, which led him
to schedule treatment and ultimately injure himself.120 It was significant in this case that
the plaintiffs formed a service contract with the hotel through the back and forth tele-
phone conversations between Barbados and Pennsylvania, thereby demonstrating that this
negligence claim arose out of the hotel's contacts with Pennsylvania. 121 The district
court's judgment was reversed and remanded for further proceedings.122
C. STREAM OF COMMERCE
Courts continue to differ on whether the mere placement or advertising of a product on
the Internet by a defendant is enough to confer personal jurisdiction in the forum where
the defendant's website is viewed. The Ninth Circuit, in Holland America Line, Inc. v.
Wartsila North America, Inc., declined to exercise jurisdiction over a Finnish holding com-
pany that maintained a website accessible in Washington. 12 3 Holland America alleged that
some combination of the companies owned by Wartsila-Wartsila Finland and Wartsila
North America-designed, manufactured, or sold a faulty engine part that contributed to
an engine fire, which destroyed one of Holland America's passenger ships. 124 The Ninth
Circuit declined to extend general personal jurisdiction based solely on Wartsila and
Wartsila Findland's sale and advertising of products on the Internet, finding that "the
placement of a product into the stream of commerce, without more, is not an act purpose-
fully directed toward a forum state." 125 Significantly, Wartsila's "passive website and
Wartsila's advertisements in various marine publications" alone, were insufficient to ex-
tend personal jurisdiction when it was clear that Wartsila had never directly, or through a
distributor, "put any products into the stream of commerce that might have ended up" in
Washington. 126 As to Wartsila Finland, there was a "paucity of contacts" with Washing-
119. Id. at 323.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 325. The court further found that exercising jurisdiction over the hotel in Pennsylvania com-
ported with "fair play and substantial justice" because the hotel had not offered a "compelling case" as to why
it would be "unreasonable and unfair" to litigate this matter in Pennsylvania. Id. at 324-25 (citing Burger
King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985)) (observing that any burden to the hotel was equally
applicable to the O'Connors having to litigate this matter in Barbados). The Third Circuit declined to
address the hotel's motion to dismiss under forum non conveniens and remanded this issue for initial consid-
eration by the district court. Id.
123. Holland Am. Line, Inc. v. Wartsila N. Am., Inc., 485 F.3d 450 (9th Cir. 2007), affg, No. C04-
1368RSM, 2005 WL 1172429 ('W.D. Wash. May 17, 2005).
124. Id. at 454. The Ninth Circuit also rejected general personal jurisdiction over Wartsila based on a forum
selection clause in Holland America's purchase orders because neither Wartsila nor Wartsila Finland ever
agreed to the clause. Id. at 458 (finding Holland America could only show that it sent the terms "via email to
an unspecified email address or general web address.") (internal citation omitted); see also Primus Corp. v.
Centreformat Ltd., 221 Fed. Appx. 492, 493-94 (8th Cit. 2007) (unpublished opinion) (noting that a choice of
law clause could support personal jurisdiction consistent with due process but such a clause, alone, ran afoul
of due process).
125. Id. at 459 (citing Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987)).
126. Id.; see Wartsila, http://www.wartsila.com. The court noted that Wartsila's website does not allow for
direct purchases and is strictly informational. Id. at 460. Moreover, ,Vartsila's related print advertisements
lacked any evidence that they were "designed specifically for the Washington market or that advertisements
are heavily or predominantly distributed in Washington." Id.
SUMMER 2008
430 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
ton; the company did not sell products directly within the United States, and company
marketing representatives never visited Washington when promoting their products to
American cruise lines. 127
A Virginia district court, in Jones v. Boto Co., however, exercised personal jurisdiction
over a foreign corporation that had no physical presence in the jurisdiction. 128 A Hong
Kong manufacturer of artificial Christmas trees, Boto Company Limited, exported its
product into the United States via Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. and Target Corporation. 129
Boto's only direct connection to the United States was an informational website, but Boto
did not sell its products on its website. 130 Following a house fire from a Boto Christmas
tree, the plaintiff homeowners sought damages from Boto in a Virginia district court.' 3'
In rejecting Boto's personal jurisdiction defense, the court found that Boto negligently
"plac[ed] a defective product into the stream of commerce," and therefore Virginia's long-
arm statute applied to Boto.132 The court applied relevant constitutional standards, 33
noting that "a substantial number" of Boto's products would be purchased in Virginia,
most of Boto's $1.1 billion sales were from the United States, and Boto sold its products
to two of the largest retailers in the United States.34 Although these facts alone were
insufficient to satisfy the constitutional minimum-contacts requirement, the court found
that, because Boto's website was accessible in Virginia, Boto created a "substantial connec-
tion with Virginia by actions purposefully directed toward it" even though the website did
not directly target Virginia. 135
127. Id. at 459-60. The court also found no basis for specific personal jurisdiction as there was no relation-
ship between the forum and the negligence claim against Wartsila and Wartsila Finland. Id. at 460-61. The
court rejected a claim of nationwide jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2) because
neither Wartsila nor Wartsila Finland alleged they are subject to "courts of general jurisdiction in any state."
Id. at 461 (outining the three-part inquiry for sustaining Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(2) jurisdiction and adopting the
practice of the Fifth, Seventh, and D.C. Circuits that a defendant can defeat application of Rule 4(k)(2) by
alleging it is subject to the general jurisdiction of any court in the country); see also Mwani v. bin Laden, 417
F.3d 1, 11 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Adams v. Unione Mediterranea Di Sicurta, 364 F.3d 646, 651 (5th Cir. 2004);
ISI Int'l, Inc., v. Borden Ladner Gervais LLP, 256 F.3d 548, 552 (7th Cir. 2001), all cited in HollandAm. Line
Inc., 485 F.3d at 461-62.
128. Jones v. Boto, Co. Ltd., 498 F. Supp. 2d 822 (E.D. Va. 2007).
129. Id. at 824. Seventy-five percent of Boto was owned by an American company, but Boto did not dis-
tribute its products in the United States; rather it negotiated sales contracts with American retailers. Id.
130. See BOTO, http://www.boto.com.hk.
131. Jones, 498 F. Supp. 2d at 823-24.
132. Id. at 827.
133. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. Ltd., 480 U.S. 102 (oudining constitutional requirements of "stream of com-
merce" analysis); Lesnick v. Hollingsworth & Vose Co., 35 F.3d 939, 945-46 (4th Cir. 1994) (requiring that
the defendant "create[ ] a substantial connection to the forum state by action purposefully directed toward the
forum state or otherwise invoking the benefits and protections of the laws of the state.").
134. Jones, 498 F. Supp. 2d at 829.
135. Id. But see FC Inv. Group LC v. IFX Mkts, Ltd., 479 F. Supp. 2d 30, 36-38 (D.D.C. 2007) (rejecting
claim that a business's informational website available in the forum constituted "doing business" under the
District of Columbia long-arm statute). The court further found that the exercise of personal jurisdiction
over Boto would not "offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice", in light of the "magnitude
of [Boto's] revenue stream and the substantial profits that likely accompany it." Jones, 498 F. Supp. 2d at 830-
31 (citing Lesnick, 35 F.3d at 945) But see Cai v. Daimlerchrysler AG, 480 F. Supp. 2d, 1245, 1251 (D. Or.
2007) (rejecting personal jurisdiction claim where, among other things, parent company earned approxi-
mately $80 billion annually from sales in the United States but was only present in Oregon through its
independent subsidiary).
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D. ENFORCEABILITY OF A FOREIGN JUDGMENT
Last year a divided Ninth Circuit extended personal jurisdiction over foreign defend-
ants and vacated a foreign judgment restricting a California corporation's ability to pub-
lish materials on its website. 136 The Second Circuit faced a similar issue involving a Saudi
Arabian citizen obtaining a libel judgment in an English court against an American author,
Rachel Ehrenfeld, for publishing a book linking him to providing financial support to
terrorist operations. 37 After receiving notice of the default judgment from the English
court, Ehrenfeld sought a declaratory judgment to render the foreign judgment unen-
forceable in the United States on "constitutional and public policy grounds."'138 The dis-
trict court dismissed the case for lack of personal jurisdiction because Mahfouz's contact
with New York related solely to pursuing the English case against Ehrenfeld and sending
her cease and desist notices.' 39 On appeal the Second Circuit found the application of
New York's long-arm statute in this case to be an open question for the Second Circuit
and New York state courts, and the court certified the question to the New York Court of
Appeals, 14° which declined to extend jurisdiction under its long-arm statute because the
defendant's New York contacts were solely related to seeking enforcement of the English
judgment and thus he had never transacted business within New York.141 On return to
the Second Circuit, plaintiff argued that the New York long-arm statute, as defined by the
New York Court of Appeals, was unconstitutional under the First Amendment. 14 2 The
Second Circuit rejected this claim as waived for plaintiff's lack of prior assertion of any
First Amendment jurisdictional basis during the litigation. 143 In light of the decision by
the New York Court of Appeals, the court affirmed the lower court's dismissal for lack of
personal jurisdiction. 144
136. Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L'Antisemitisme, 169 F. Supp. 2d 1181 (N.D. Cal.
2001), revd, 379 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2004), rev'd and remanded, 433 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc). See
generally International Legal Developments in Review 2006: International Litigation: Personaljrisdiction, 41 INT'L
LAW. 329, 334-36 (2007).
137. Ehrenfeld v. Mahfouz, 489 F.3d 542 (2d Cir. 2007); see also Sheikh It All About, THE ECONOMIST, Nov.
8, 2007, available at http://www.economist.com/world/internationalldisplaystory.cfm?story-id=10110971
(last visited Nov. 15, 2007); RACHEL EHRENFELD, FUNDING EVIL: How TERRORISM IS FINANCED AND
How TO STOP IT (2003).
138. Ehrenfeld, 489 F.3d at 545. The English judgment "requir[ed] Ehrenfeld to refrain from 'publishing, or
causing or authori[zling the further publication' of the disputed statements about Mahfuoz in Funding Evil
within the English court's jurisdiction." Id. at 547 (internal quotations omitted) (distinguishing from dispute
in Yahoo!, Inc. over ripeness issue).
139. Ehrenfeld v. Bin Mahfouz, No. 04 Civ. 9641, 2006 WL 1096816, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 2006)
(memorandum & order) (declining to apply New York's long-arm statute, N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1), ex-
tending personal jurisdiction over "a non-domiciliary who 'in person or through an agent ... transacts any
business within the state' so long as the cause of action arises out of defendant's New York transactions.").
140. Ehrenfeld, 489 F.3d at 547-51 (certifying pursuant to N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 22, § 500.27(a)
and 2d Cir. R. 0.27). The court affirmed the district court's finding of no personal jurisdiction over defendant
under N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(3). Id. at 551.
141. Ehrenfeld v. Mahfouz, 9 N.Y.3d 501, 509, 881 N.E.2d 830 (2007). In answering the certified question,
the court noted that effect of the practice of libel tourism was not the issue before it. Id. at 507, N.E.2d at
834.
142. Ehrenfeld v. Mahfouz, 518 F.3d 102, 105 (2d Cir. 2008).
143. Id.
144. Id. at 106.
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IV. The Act of State Doctrine*
A. INTRODUCTION
The act of state doctrine is a non-jurisdictional rule generally prohibiting U.S. domestic
courts from inquiring into the validity of public acts of foreign sovereigns. 145 The doc-
trine is "grounded on judicial concern that application of customary principles of law to
judge the acts of a foreign sovereign might frustrate the conduct of foreign relations by
the political branches of the government."' 46 Once invoked, the doctrine requires U.S.
courts to deem valid the acts of foreign sovereigns committed within those sovereigns'
own territories. 147 The burden of proving that the doctrine applies rests with the party
attempting to invoke it as a basis for dismissing the action. 148 The application of the
doctrine is separate from the sovereign immunity inquiry, and courts must evaluate each
doctrine separately. 149
In 2007, courts addressed the interplay between the act of state doctrine and exceptions
to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA). The significant development of note
was the D.C. Circuit's decision in Nemariam v. Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia that
the Second Hickenlooper Amendment and the expropriation exception of the FSIA need
not be interpreted similarly.50 Courts also addressed whether specific acts by foreign
countries constituted acts of state, including the grant of patents by foreign countries, the
purchase of artwork, and the issuance of generalized court orders not tied to particular
property.
B. INTERPLAY WITH THE FSIA's EXPROPRIATION AND STATE-SPONSORED
TERRORISM EXCEPTIONS
Two cases highlighted the interplay between the act of state doctrine and the FSIA's
exceptions. In Nemariam v. Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, the D.C. Circuit re-
jected the view "that because the expropriation exception [of the FSIA] and the Hick-
enlooper Amendment serve a similar purpose, the statutes must be interpreted
consistently."' 5 1 The FSIA's expropriation exception, 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3), provides
subject matter jurisdiction by creating an exception to sovereign immunity for a claim
involving the expropriation of "rights in property." The Second Hickenlooper Amend-
ment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 creates an exception to the act of state doc-
trine for a claim involving the expropriation of a "claim of title or other right to
* Contributed by Fahad A. Habib, associate atJones Day, Washington, D.C. The views herein are of the
author and do not necessarily reflect those of Jones Day. This summary was prepared as of November 15,
2007.
145. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 401 (1964).
146. First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 767 (1972).
147. See W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co., Inc. v. Envtl. Tectonics Corp., 493 U.S. 400, 406 (1990).
148. See Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 691 (1976).
149. See Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 701 (2004) (a "determination that the [Foreign Sovereign Inmu-
nities Act] applies .. .in no way affects any argument [ithe State] may have that the [act of state] doctrine
shields [its] alleged wrongdoing").
150. Nemariam v. Fed. Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 491 F.3d 470 (D.C. Cir. 2007). A discussion of
the Nernariam court's analysis of the expropriation exception to the FSIA is discussed supra in Part I(B)(3).
151. Id. at 479.
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property."'1 52 This similarity had caused some courts, including the Fifth Circuit, to hold
that because the FSIA's expropriation exception and Second Hickenlooper Amendment
address "parallel[ ]" issues, analysis under the two should be treated as "congruent." s5 3
The district court in Nemariam, relying upon Second Circuit case law from the act of
state context holding that the Second Hickenlooper Amendment did not apply to intangi-
ble property, had held that the FSIA's expropriation exception also did not apply to intan-
gible property. 5 4 The D.C. Circuit rejected the lower court's conclusion, reasoning that
neither the text nor the legislative history of the expropriation exception supported the
reading that the two statutes should be interpreted consistently.ss Consequently, the
court reasoned that it was free to interpret the FSIA's expropriation exception indepen-
dently of the interpretation under the Second Hickenlooper Amendment and concluded
that the plain reading and legislative history of the FSIA's expropriation exception do not
limit its application to tangible property. 5 6
In addition to divorcing the analysis under the Second Hickenlooper Amendment from
that under the FSIA's expropriation exception, Nemariam also appeared to signal the D.C.
Circuit's dissatisfaction with the limitation of the Second Hickenlooper Amendment to
tangible property. Thus, the court in Nemariam pointed out that the district court for the
Southern District of New York had expressed doubt about the distinction between tangi-
ble and intangible property and had noted that the Second Circuit, which restricts the
Second Hickenlooper Amendment to tangible property, had nevertheless stated, seem-
ingly inconsistently, that the definition of property in international law commonly in-
cludes intangible property.157
In Beaty v. Republic of Iraq, the district court for the District of Columbia held that the
act of state doctrine did not bar adjudication of a claim against the Republic of Iraq for
emotional distress suffered by the children of two men detained and allegedly held as
hostages by the former Iraqi regime in the 1990s.15 8 Subject matter jurisdiction was in-
voked under the FSIA's state-sponsored terrorism exception, 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7).159
The court accepted that the factual predicate for application of the act of state doctrine
existed in the case, given that plaintiffs' claims centered on the propriety of the Iraqi
government's detention and imprisonment of plaintiffs' fathers within Iraqi territory. The
court nevertheless concluded that the purpose of the doctrine would not be furthered by
its application in the case.' 60 The court shared the skepticism of other district courts
152. 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1998).
153. De Sanchez v. Banco Cent. de Nicaragua, 770 F.2d 1385, 1395 (5th Cir. 1985); see also Canadian
Overseas Ores Ltd. v. Compania de Acero del Pacifico, S.A., 528 F. Supp. 1337, 1346 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), affd,
727 F.2d 274 (2d Cit. 1984).
154. Nemariam v. Fed. Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 400 F. Supp. 2d 76 (D.D.C. 2005) (holding that
right to bank account was intangible property not covered by FSIA expropriation exception).
155. Nemariam, 491 F.3d at 479 (concluding, based on legislative history, that "instead of limiting the expro-
priation exception to tangible property, the Congress expressed confidence that federal courts would not
apply the act of state doctrine too broadly-that is, to 'improperl[yl' prevent adjudication on the merits after
jurisdiction has been established") (citations omitted)).
156. Id. at 479-480.
157. Id. at 478 (discussing Zappia Middle East Constr. Co. v. Emirate of Abu Dhabi, No. 94 CIV. 1942,
1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10430, 1996 WL 413680 (S.D.N.Y. July 24, 1996)).
158. Beaty v. Republic of Iraq, 480 F. Supp. 2d 60, 62 (D.D.C. 2007).
159. Id.
160. Id. at 89 (citing W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Envtl. Tectonics Corp., 493 U.S. 400, 405 (1990)).
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about whether the doctrine ought to be applied to suits brought under the state-sponsored
terrorism exception, given that:
the political branches enacted a statute [28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7)] whose text and struc-
ture expressly contemplate holding a foreign state liable for terrorist acts committed
years earlier, and that this statute does not come into play unless the Executive
Branch had identified a nation as a sponsor of terrorism at the time of the acts at
issue.' 6a
On this basis, the court concluded, "it is difficult if not impossible to say that the judiciary
would be unduly interfering with the political branches' conduct of foreign policy, which
is the principal concern underlying the act-of-state doctrine."162
The court also held as insufficient Iraq's arguments that the regime had changed since
the acts were perpetrated and had been replaced by a new government whose stability and
success were a major foreign policy goal of the United States.163 Although acknowledging
that a change in government is usually significant to an act-of-state analysis, the court also
was not convinced that that single distinction was sufficient to interfere with the foreign
policy objective of the state-sponsored terrorism exception, particularly where the lawsuit
was filed before the regime changed.164 The court was also swayed by the fact that "the
Executive Branch, despite the President's publicly expressed desire to shield Iraq from
liability, ha[d] declined to raise the act-of-state doctrine in its Statements of Interest and
ha[d] explicitly declined to support Iraq's invocation of the doctrine."165 The court was
not convinced by Iraq's argument that dismissal was appropriate on act of state grounds
despite the position of the Executive Branch, distinguishing cases cited in support as being
claims that were likely to embarrass the government. 166
C. NATURE OF AN ACT OF STATE
In an unusual application of the act of state doctrine, in Voda v. Cordis Corp., a U.S.
patent infringement case, the Federal Circuit held that the lower court had abused its
discretion in assuming supplemental subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C
§ 1367 over certain foreign patents, inter alia, because the alleged infringer would be una-
ble, unfairly, to challenge the validity of the foreign patents because of the act of state
doctrine. 167 In reaching this conclusion, the court, without analysis (indeed citing con-
trary precedent), stated that it was not persuaded by the parties or by amici curiae that the
grant of a patent by a sovereign is not an act of state. 168
161. Id. (citing Owens v. Republic of Sudan, 374 F. Supp. 2d 1, 26-27 (D.D.C. 2005) and Daliberti v.
Republic of Iraq, 97 F. Supp. 2d 38, 54-55 (D.D.C. 2000)).
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 89-90.
165. Id. at 90.
166. Id.
167. Voda v. Cordis Corp., 476 F.3d 887, 905 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
168. Id. The dissenting judge vigorously protested that "patent validity and infringement are legal and com-
mercial issues, not acts of state," on the basis that "[t]he fundamental criterion is whether the governmental
action is a significant public act or whether it is a ministerial function." Id. at 914-15 (Newman, J., dissent-
ing). Further, the dissent continued, "No support has been offered for so creative an application of interna-
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The District Court for the District of Columbia was also concerned with the nature of
an "act of state" in Malewicz v. City of Amsterdam, where the court held that it was not
barred by the act of state doctrine from considering the validity of the City of Amster-
dam's acquisition of certain paintings in Germany, which plaintiffs alleged was an unlaw-
ful taking in a suit brought while the paintings were on loan in the United States.169 The
court rejected the City of Amsterdam's argument that the acquisition was an "official act"
of the city and thereby an act of state.' 70 The court reasoned that the act of state doctrine
is limited to "official action by a foreign sovereign" undertaken "by right of sovereignty,"
while "any private person or entity could have purchased the paintings for display in a
public or private museum.' 71
The court also relied upon other bases for the inapplicability of the act of state doctrine.
First, the court reasoned that the fact that the paintings had been purchased in Germany
both illustrated the commercial rather than sovereign nature of the act and brought the
act outside the ambit of the act of state doctrine, which does not apply to extraterritorial
acts. 172 Separately, the court also took into consideration its view that applying interna-
tional law would not frustrate foreign relations and that any chilling effect on the loaning
of artwork "was not a matter touching upon 'foreign relations,' as that phrase is used by
relevant authorities." 173
Finally, in United States v. Lazarenko, the District Court for the Northern District of
California held that the act of state doctrine did not bar criminal forfeiture of assets of a
foreign bank by the United States where liquidators of the bank had been authorized by
the government of Antigua to act to recover the assets of the bank. 174 The court reasoned
that the liquidators had not identified any orders from the Antiguan courts that gave spe-
cific orders as to the assets in question that would be invalidated by the court's actions. 175
The court was also persuaded that "the [U.S. g]overnment's positions taken in this matter
undercut the separation of powers concerns that motivate the act of state doctrine." 176
V. International Discovery'
A. OBTAINING U.S. DISCOVERY FOR USE IN FOREIGN PROCEEDINGS
During 2007, U.S. courts built on previous jurisprudence regarding the statutory and
discretionary requirements for obtaining discovery in the United States for use in foreign
tional law; this 'doctrine' provides no support for this court's removal of judicial discretion of United States
courts to resolve a commercial dispute between private parties involving private patent rights." Id.
169. Malewicz v. City of Amsterdam, 517 F. Supp. 2d 322 (D.D.C. 2007).
170. Id. at 337-339.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 339.
173. Id.
174. United States v. Lazarenko, 504 F. Supp. 2d 791, 801-02 (N.D. Cal. 2007).
175. Id.
176. Id. at 802.
* Contributed by Jeffrey S. Robins, Trial Attorney, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. The views
expressed are those of the author and not necessarily those of the Department of Justice or the United States
Government.
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proceedings pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a). 177 U.S. courts addressed the applicability of
Section 1782(a) to: private commercial arbitral bodies; documents outside of the United
States; and documents that may not be admissible in the foreign jurisdiction.178 U.S.
courts also further analyzed the factors to determine whether to exercise their discretion
and allow discovery pursuant to Section 1782.
Previously, U.S. courts have determined that private commercial arbitral bodies are not
included in the types of tribunals to which Section 1782(a) applies.179 The District Court
for the District of New Jersey in In re Oxus Gold, however, found that a private interna-
tional arbitration fell within the scope of Section 1782 because the arbitration was "be-
tween two admittedly private litigants . . . within a framework defined by [a] bilateral
investment treaty and is governed by ... UNCITRAL rules."'180 The court also found
that Section 1782 does not contain a foreign-admissibility requirement with regard to
documents that may not be admissible in a foreign jurisdiction. 18 1
U.S. courts were split regarding the applicability of Section 1782(a) to documents
outside the United States. In considering this issue, the District Court for the Southern
District of New York in In re Gemeinshcaftspraxis Dr. Med. Schottdorf found that limiting
the applicability of Section 1782(a) to documents inside the United States would violate
the U.S. Supreme Court's instruction in Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. that
Section 1782 not be construed "to include requirements that are not plainly provided for
in the text of the statute." 182 Rather, the court there found that the location of documents
should be a discretionary consideration at most.183 The District Court for the Western
District of Michigan in In re Nokia Corp., however, questioned in dicta whether a U.S.
court could order production of documents contained outside of the United States. 184
Lastly, like courts before them, courts that considered whether to exercise their discre-
tion to order discovery pursuant to Section 1782185 continued in 2007 to look for explicit
177. See 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (West 1996) ("The district court of the district in which a person resides or is
found may order him to give his testimony or statement or to produce a document or other thing for use in a
proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal."); see also Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542
U.S. 241 (2004) (interpreting the scope of the statutory provisions and establishing factors to guide the dis-
cretionary application of the statute).
178. In addition to expanding Section 1782 jurisprudence, many courts also agreed with the reasoning of the
Intel Court. See, e.g., In re Clerici, 481 F.3d 1324, 1332 (11 th Cir. 2007) (finding that request of Panamanian
Court for assistance to obtain sworn answers to questions regarding assets and other financial matters was
proper, and the Panamanian Court's request did not seek to enforce that Court's judgment). The court in In
re Clereci further held that there was no requirement that the proceeding for which discovery was sought be
adjudicative in nature. Id. at 1333.
179. See Nat'l Broad. Co., Inc. v. Bear Steams & Co., Inc., 165 F.3d 184 (2d Cir. 1999) and Republic of
Kazakhstan v. Biederman Int'l, 168 F.3d 880 (5th Cir. 1999) (finding that tribunals were limited to gover-
mental bodies).
180. In re Oxus Gold, PLC, No. 06-82-GEB, 2007 WL 1037387, at *5 (D. NJ. Apr. 2, 2007).
181. Id. at *5.
182. In re Gemeinshcaftspraxis Dr. Med. Schottdorf, No. Civ. M19-88 (BSJ), 2006 WL 3844464, at *5
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 29, 2006), citing Intel, 542 U.S. at 260.
183. Id. at *5; see also In re Nokia Corp., No. 1:07-MC-47, 2007 WL 1729664 (W.D. Mich. June 13, 2007).
184. See In re Nokia Corp., No. 1:07-MC-47, 2007 VVL 1729664 at *5 n. 4.
185. The Intel Court established factors to guide the court's discretionary application of the statute: (1)
whether "the person from whom discovery is sought is a participant in the foreign proceeding"; (2) "the
nature of the foreign tribunal, the character of the proceedings underway abroad, and the receptivity of the
foreign government or the court or agency abroad to U.S. federal-court judicial assistance"; (3) whether "the
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statements and authoritative proof to determine whether foreign jurisdictions are recep-
tive to U.S. judicial assistance.'8 6 'While courts continued to find that Section 1782 does
not require exhaustion of other forms of discovery; courts in 2007 were united in their
positive view of discovery attempts made in foreign jurisdictions when the person from
whom discovery was sought was a participant in the foreign proceeding.18 7 Courts, how-
ever, were split on whether the lack of a local discovery request can be characterized as an
attempt to circumvent the foreign jurisdiction.' 88
B. OBTAINTING DISCOVERY FROM ABROAD FOR USE IN U.S. PROCEEDINGS
During 2007, U.S. courts also further developed the jurisprudence regarding the discre-
tionary factors guiding requests for discovery from abroad for use in proceedings in the
United States by means other than the Hague Convention. 189 The U.S. Supreme Court
in Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. U.S. District Court for Southern District of Iowa,
did not articulate a standard with regard to the appropriate level of relevancy to apply to
the discovery of foreign documents via the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.i90 U.S.
courts, however, have consistently applied standards aimed at balancing comity and the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In Weiss v. National Westminster Bank, PLC, the District
Court for the Eastern District of New York considered whether the discovery sought was
relevant and crucial.'91 Similarly, the District Court for the Northern District of Califor-
request conceals an attempt to circumvent foreign proof-gathering limits or other policies of a foreign coun-
try or the United States"; and (4) whether the request is unduly intrusive or burdensome. See Intel, 542 U.S.
at 264-65.
186. See In re Gemeinschaftspraxis Dr. Med. Schottdorf, 2006 WVL 3844464, at *6 (citing Euromepa S.A. v.
R. Esmerian, Inc., 51 F.3d 1095, 1099-1100 (2d Cir. 1995)) (finding authoritative proof lacking that would
support notion that the German court was unreceptive to Section 1782 discovery and further finding that the
German Court had the option of excluding the discovered material from its proceedings).
187. See In re Digitechnic, No. C07-414-JCC, 2007 WVL 1367697 at *4 (W.D. Wash. May 8, 2007); In re
Nokia Corp., 2007 WL 1729664, at *5 n. 4.
188. Compare In re Digitechnic, No. C07-414-JCC, 2007 V.TL 1367697 at *5 (finding that "eleventh-hour
discovery application seeking discovery never sought in France certainly seems to be a circumvention at-
tempt"), with In re Fleischmann, 466 F. Supp. 2d 1020, 1032 (N.D. I11. 2006) (citing In re Euromepa S.A., 51
F.3d at 1098, and John Deere Ltd. v. Sperry Corp., 754 F.2d 132,136 (3d Cir. 1985)) (finding that were there
was no local ruling denying discovery, there could be no effort to circumvent the foreign jurisdiction).
189. See Societe Nationale Industrielle Alrospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court for the S. Dist. of Iowa, 482 U.S.
522 (1987); RESTATEIMENF (TFiIRi)) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 442(1)(c) (setting out five factors: "[(1)
I the importance to the ... litigation of the documents or other information requested; [(2)] the degree of
specificity of the request; [(3)] whether the information originated in the United States; [(4)]; the availability
of alternative means of securing the infonnation; and [(5)] the extent to which noncompliance with the re-
quest would undermine important interests of the United States, or compliance with the request would un-
dermine the important interest of the state where the information is located"). Courts in the Second Circuit
also consider "the hardship of compliance on the party or witness from whom discovery is sought [and] the
good faith of the party resisting discovery." STRAUSS V. CREDIT LyoNNAis, S.A., 242 F.R.D. 199, 210
(E.D.N.Y. 2007) (citations omitted).
190. Because discovery pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) is broader than most foreign jurisdictions, the
Airospatiale Court cautioned the need for respecting comity in the course of such requests but failed to spell
out a standard for relevance. Aerospatiale, 482 U.S. at 542.
191. Weiss v. Nat'l Westminster Bank, PLC, 242 F.R.D. 33, 44-45 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (finding documents
regarding the corporate relationship, services offered, and financials were relevant and crucial to terrorist
financing case).
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nia in In re Rubber Cbemicals Antitrust Litigation considered whether the discovery sought
was important and relevant. 192
Courts have also continued to recognize that the use of the Hague Convention proce-
dures may be impracticable.193 In SEC v. Sandifur, the court favored discovery pursuant
to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure where the court found that Hague discovery could
take a long time, might be fruitless if a country exercised its right to limit discovery pursu-
ant to Article 23 of the Convention, and where the inability to obtain documents pursuant
to the Hague Convention would make it impossible to resort to the federal rules as backup
without severely disrupting the trial schedule. 194 But the District Court for the Eastern
District of New York in Metso Minerals Inc. v. Powerscreen International Distribution Ltd.,
recognized that there are circumstances where parties have no choice but to rely on dis-
covery pursuant to the Hague Convention or non-Convention letters rogatory 95 There,
the court found that the Hague Convention was the only means to obtain the requested
discovery where the party from whom discovery was sought was a citizen of Northern
Ireland, not a party to the action, and not subject to the jurisdiction of the court. 196
Finally, where U.S. courts have balanced the interests of the United States with the
interests of the foreign states where information is located, U.S. courts have continued to
examine whether a "foreign entity has taken a clear position and articulated reasons why it
believes production of the requested documents would harm its interests . ",197 Courts
in 2007 have appeared to have applied a lower standard when faced with discovery re-
quests in terrorist financing cases that are otherwise protected by bank secrecy statutes, as
U.S. courts have consistently found that the interest of combating terrorism outweighs the
interest of bank customer secrecy. 198 The lynchpin to these decisions was the courts'
findings that the foreign governments in question had recognized the supremacy of the
interest in combating terrorism through the governments' participation in financial action
task forces and international conventions. 99
C. INTERNATIONAL ELECTRONIC DIscovERY
There were no decisions in 2007 that explicitly addressed the impact of the 2006 revi-
sions to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure regarding electronic discovery. One grow-
ing concern, however, is whether U.S. courts will defer to the laws of other jurisdictions
192. In re Rubber Chemicals Antitrust Litig., 486 F. Supp. 2d 1078, 1083 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (finding impor-
tance and relevance of documents from the European Commission regarding plaintiffs' exclusion from the
U.S. market lacking where plaintiff already had documents relating to the Department of Justice anti-trust
investigation).
193. See SEC v. Sandifur, No. C05-163 Ic, 2006 WL 3692611, at "4-5 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 11, 2006); Weiss,
242 F.R.D. at 45.
194. See Sandifitr, 2006 VVL 3692611, at *5.
195. Metso Minerals Inc. v. Powerscreen Int'l Dist. Ltd., No. CV 06-1446 (ADS)(ETB), 2007 WL 1875560
(E.D.N.Y. June 25, 2007).
196. Id. at *2-3.
197. See In re Rubber Chemicals Antitrust Litig., 486 F. Supp. 2d at 1084.
198. See Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC, 463 F. Supp. 2d 310, 314-15 (E.D.N.Y. 2006); Weiss, 242 F.R.D. at 45-
55; Strauss, 242 F.R.D. at 213-224.
199. See Weiss, 242 F.R.D. at 48 (discussing the "United Nations' International Convention for the Suppres-
sion of the Financing of Terrorism, which recommends that nations adopt[ I effective measures for the pre-
vention of the financing of terrorism ... ").
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that limit the electronic transmission of information across borders and afford greater
privacy protections.2 00 In coming years, courts will likely balance any explicit statements
regarding the interests of the foreign jurisdictions with the interests at stake in the
litigation. 201
D. OTHER DEVELOPMENTS
In 2007, U.S. courts also addressed: the application of Fed. R. Civ. P. 28(b) to foreign
telephone depositions;2°2 the implications of the political question doctrine to the scope of
international discovery requests; 203 and a witness' right to invoke the Fifth Amendment
Privilege against self-incrimination pursuant to Article 11 (a) of the Hague Convention. 2°4
VI. Extraterritorial Application of United States Law*
A. INTRODUCTION
Courts look to the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations when determining
whether to apply U.S. law extraterritorially. The Rcstatement provides that a State may
exercise prescriptive jurisdiction where the conduct in question "has or is intended to have
a substantial effect within its territory." 205 A court must consider the following factors in
determining whether extraterritorial jurisdiction is reasonable: (1) the extent of the do-
mestic effect of the conduct; (2) the connections between the United States and the per-
sons engaging in the conduct in question; (3) the character of the conduct and the extent
to which it is regulated elsewhere; (4) whether justified expectations exist and are pro-
tected; (5) the importance of the regulation internationally; (6) consistency with interna-
tional custom; (7) the interests of other States in regulating the conduct; and (8) whether
the regulation would create a conflict with the laws of a foreign jurisdiction. 20 6
In the past year, U.S. courts have applied these principles in a variety of fields, consider-
ing extraterritoriality in disputes involving constitutional claims, commercial disputes and
criminal statutes.
200. See Steven C. Bennett, Facing the Challenges of International E-Discovery, Practising L. Inst., 766 PLI
291, 298-99 (Oct.-Dec. 2007) (citing Council Directive 95/46, 1995 OJ. (L 281) 31 (EC), which requires
member states to "protect the fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons, and in particular their
right to privacy with respect to the processing of personal data").
201. See e.g., In re Rubber Chemicals Antitrust Litig., 486 F. Supp. 2d at 1084; Linde, 463 F. Supp. 2d at 314-
15.
202. Phye v. Thill, No. 06-1309-MLB, 2007 WL 2681106 (D. Kan. Sept. 7, 2007) (requiring that the wit-
ness and the person administering the oath be at the same location).
203. Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 473 F.3d 345 (D.C. Cir. 2007). Because of Statement of Interest from
Department of State implicating international relations concerns, the court included requirement for docu-
ment production of documents located in Indonesia only "after any necessary authorization" from the Indo-
nesian government. Id.
204. Nursing Home Pension Fund v. Oracle Corp., No. CO1-00988 MJJ, 2007 WL 1880381, at "15 ("Arti-
cle 1 l(a) of the Hague Convention provides [individuals] with a privilege against self-incrimination at least as
broad as any independent right that [they] could derive directly from the United States Constitution").
* Contributed by Karen Woody, Law Clerk to the Honorable Phyllis D. Thompson, District of
Columbia Court of Appeals.
205. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 402 (1987).
206. Id. § 403(2).
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B. FEDERAL HABEAS CLAIMS
In previous reviews, we have considered various federal habeas corpus cases brought by
detainees. 2007 is no exception, in light of the recent rulings in Boumediene v. Bush20 7 and
In re Iraq and Afghanistan Detainees Litigation.20 In Boumediene, the detainees were cap-
tured abroad and held as enemy combatants in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The District of
Columbia Circuit considered whether the Mlitary Commissions Act provision barring
federal court jurisdiction over the detainees' habeas petitions was an unconstitutional vio-
lation of the Suspension Clause.209 The court rejected the detainees' claim, stating that
Supreme Court precedent "holds that the Constitution does not confer rights on aliens
without property or presence within the United States." 210 The Boumediene ruling vacated
and dismissed the decision in Khalid v. Bush, in which detainees' habeas petitions were
considered by the D.C. District Court, and stated that the amendment to the habeas
corpus statute precluded federal jurisdiction over the detainees' habeas petitions pending
on the date of enactment.21'
In In re Iraq and Afghanistan Detainees Litigation, the plaintiffs claimed their Fifth and
Eighth Amendment rights were violated while detained by the United States military at
various locations in Iraq and Afghanistan.212 The D.C. District Court, in holding that the
Fifth and Eighth Amendments did not apply to plaintiffs, stated, "the Constitution's reach
is not so expansive that it encompasses these nonresident aliens who were injured extrater-
ritorially while detained by the military in foreign countries where the United States is
engaged in wars. '213 The court also stated that even if the Eighth Amendment applied to
nonresident enemy aliens, its prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment did not
apply to plaintiffs because they were never convicted of a crime of any sort.214
C. CIL CONTEMPT ORDERS
In Autotech Technologies, L.P. v. Integral Research & Development Corp., discussed supra in
Parts I(B)(1) and (C)(1), plaintiffs issued a writ of execution for monies due as a result of a
contempt order against a wholly-owned Belarusian government company.215 In declining
to authorize the execution of the contempt order against unidentified Belarusian property
outside the United States, the Seventh Circuit explained that if Autotech sought assets in a
207. Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 127 S.Ct. 1478 (2007); denial ofcert.
vacated, 127 S.Ct. 3078 (2007).
208. In re Iraq & Afghanistan Detainees Litig., 479 F.Supp.2d 85 (D.D.C. 2007).
209. Boumediene, 476 F.3d at 988-94.
210. Id. at 991.
211. Khalid v. Bush, 355 F.Supp.2d 311 (D.D.C. Cir. 2005). A discussion of Khalid v. Bush appears in
International Legal Developments in Review 2005: International Litigation: Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Law,
40 LNr'L LAW 275, 300 (2006).
212. In re Iraq and Afghanistan Detainees Litig., 479 F.Supp.2d at 91.
213. Id. at 95.
214. Id. at 103.
215. Autotech Tech., L.P. v. Integral Research & Dev. Corp., 499 F.3d 737 (7th Cir. 2007). As discussed in
more detail in Parts I(B)(1) and (C)(1), the Seventh Circuit held that it had jurisdiction over this matter under
the FSIA but declined to allow execution against the defendant for property not in the United States or not
used for commercial activities in the United States. Id. at 750 (the FSIA did not authorize Autotech to
execute a contempt order against a foreign sovereign's property "wherever that property is located around the
world.").
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foreign state, it must first try to obtain recognition and enforcement of the U.S. judgment
in the foreign courts.216 The court added that only after successful recognition of the U.S.
judgment in foreign courts would it authorize enforcement of the judgment.217 Based on
this rationale, the court held that the presumption against extraterritorial application was
sound.218
D. CRImINAL STATUTES
In United States v. Frank, the District Court for the Southern District of Florida held
that Congress' exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction in enacting a statute prohibiting
child sex tourism, entitled "Engaging in illicit sexual conduct in foreign places, '2 9 did not
violate international law.220 Frank traveled from the United States to Cambodia and en-
gaged in sexual conduct with females under the age of 18. Frank contended that the
statute violated international law because it failed to recognize that the age of consent in
Cambodia is 15. The court ruled, however, that Congress had the power to control and
punish the conduct of American citizens abroad.221 The court also stated that extraterri-
torial application of the statute was appropriate because the statute was enacted in order to
implement the Optional Protocol to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the
Child on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution, and Child Pornography, a treaty rati-
fied by the Senate. 222
Similarly, the District Court for the District of Connecticut recently held in United
States v. Ionia Management. S.A. that the United States had jurisdiction to prosecute Ionia
Management for falsifying oil record books, despite the fact that the underlying act of
improper discharge of oil occurred outside the territorial waters of the United States. 223
Ionia Management maintained that international law principles provide that individual
states may not criminally prosecute for violations of international pollution laws beyond
their territorial seas.22 4 The court explained that Ionia was not charged for violation of
international law for polluting but for violation of a U.S. law related to misrepresenting oil
records while in port.2 2 5
In United States v. Lopez-Vanegas, the Eleventh Circuit considered whether the Compre-
hensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 applied extraterritorially. 226 De-
fendants Lopez and Salazar were convicted in the District Court for the Southern District
of Florida of conspiracy to possess with the intent to distribute cocaine. Defendants ar-
gued that although they had held meetings in Miami, the plan to ship cocaine from Co-
216. Id. As discussed supra Part I(C)(1), the writ did not identify any specific property. But the court noted
that "Autotech frankly admitted that it intended to use the writ to levy against assets outside the United
States." Autotecb, 499 F.3d. at 751.
217. Autotecb, 499 F.3d. at 751.
218. Id. at 750-51.
219. 18 U.S.C. § 242 3(c).
220. United States v. Frank, 486 F.Supp.2d 1353 (S.D.Fla. 2007).
221. Id. at 1359-60.
222. Id. at 1360.
223. United States v. Ionia Mgmt. S.A, 498 F.Supp. 2d 477 (D.Conn. 2007).
224. Id. at 487.
225. Id.
226. United States v. Lopez-Vanegas, 493 F.3d 1305 (1 lth Cir. 2007). Specifically, the court considered the
extraterritorial application of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846.
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lombia to Venezuela to Saudi Arabia to France did not violate the Act because the
possession and distribution of cocaine would occur on foreign soil. Although other fed-
eral courts had applied the Act extraterritorially, even though it is silent on its extraterrito-
rial applicability, the Eleventh Circuit stated that in each of those cases some other nexus
to the United States allowed for the extraterritorial application. 227 The court vacated the
convictions and sentences because the object of the conspiracy was to possess controlled
substances outside of the United States, which is not a violation of the Act.2 28
VII. Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards and Judgments*
A. INTRODUCTION
The U.N. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards (New York Convention or Convention), signed on June 10, 1958, governs the
recognition and enforcement of most foreign arbitral awards in U.S. courts. 229 The New
York Convention applies to awards "made in the territory of a State other than the State
where the recognition and enforcement of such awards are sought" and to awards not
considered to be domestic in the enforcing State.230
State law governs the enforcement of foreign judgments. Most states have enacted stat-
utes that resemble or replicate the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act
(Uniform Act). If a state has no such statute, courts typically apply the principles of com-
ity as articulated in the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Hilton v. Guyot.2 31 The analysis
is similar in either case.
B. RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN ARBITRAL AwARDs
1. Non-Enforcement Based on Set-Aside of Award in Foreign Court
The D.C. Circuit affirmed the refusal of the district court to enforce an arbitral award
that had been annulled by a Columbian court in TermoRio S.A. E.S.P. v. Electranta S.P.232
TermoRio obtained an arbitral award of US $60.3 million against Electranta, a Colum-
bian-owned public utility, arising out of the breach of a power purchase agreement. The
227. Lopez-Vanegas, 493, F.3d at 1312-13.
228. Id. at 1313.
* Contributed by Heather Van Slooten Walsh, Attorney-Adviser, Officer of the Legal Adviser, United
States Department of State. The views expressed are those of the author and not necessarily those of the
Department of State or the United States Government.
229. U.N. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21
U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38, ("New York Convention" or "Convention") (entered into force for the
United States Dec. 29, 1970, subject to declarations implemented by 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208 (2007)). The
United States made two reservations in signing the treaty. First, awards must be made in the territory of a
Convention signatory. Second, the Convention only applies to disputes arising out of commercial relation-
ships. The latter reservation is also codified at 9 U.S.C. § 202.
230. Id. art. I(1).
231. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
232. TermoRio S.A. E.S.P. v. Electranta S.P., 487 F.3d 928 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
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parties' arbitration agreement was governed by Columbian law. Columbia's highest ad-
ministrative court, the Consejo de Estado, annulled the award. The Consejo de Estado
found that the arbitration clause in the power purchase agreement violated Columbian law
because Columbian law did not expressly allow the use of the procedural rules of the
International Chamber of Commerce, for which the parties' arbitration agreement
provided.
TermoRio subsequently sought confirmation and enforcement of the award before the
U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The district court concluded that it had
subject matter jurisdiction over the enforcement claim but dismissed the request because
the Columbian courts had vacated the award.
The Court of Appeals affirmed. Under the New York Convention, Article V(1)(e), a
court may refuse to recognize and enforce an award if "[t]he award has ... been set aside
or suspended by a competent authority of the country in which, or under the law of which,
that award was made."2 33 The court concluded that, where the foreign court has such
primary jurisdiction, the foreign court "will be free to set aside or modify an award in
accordance with its domestic arbitral law and its full panoply of express and implied
grounds for relief."234 Because the Consejo de Estado was a "competent authority" and
because there was no evidence that the judgment was not authentic, the court concluded
that TermoRio had not stated a cause of action under the New York Convention. 235 The
court concluded that "an arbitration award does not exist to be enforced in other Con-
tracting States if it had been lawfully 'set aside' by a competent authority in the State in
which the award was made. This principle controls the disposition of this case." 236
The appeals court also rejected TermoRio's argument that U.S. courts have discretion
to enforce an award notwithstanding its annulment in another country if the foreign judg-
ment is contrary to the public policy of the United States. The court noted that the
standard for finding that a judgment is repugnant to public policy "is high, and infre-
quently met."237 It further reasoned that, because Article V(2)(b) of the Convention spe-
cifically incorporates a public policy exception and because Article V(l)(e) does not, "it
would be strange indeed to recognize such an implicit limitation in Article V(1)(e) that is
broader than the express limitation in Article V(2)(b)."238 In any event, the court con-
cluded, TermoRio had not alleged that the proceedings before or the judgments of the
Columbian courts violated basic notions of justice, as would be required under the public
policy exception.239
2. Availability of Foreign Anti-Suit Injunction to Prevent Debtor from Vitiating Confirmed
Arbitral Award
The Second Circuit, in Karaha Bodas Company, L.L.C. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan
Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara, held that the judgment creditor, Karaha Bodas Company,
233. New York Convention, supra note 229, at art. V(1)(e).
234. TermoRio, 487 F.3d at 935.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 936.
237. Id. at 938.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 939.
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L.L.C. (KBC) was entitled to an injunction restraining state-owned Perusahaan
Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara (Pertamina) from pursuing litigation in the
Cayman Islands in an attempt to annul an arbitral award that had been confirmed and
enforced by federal courts in New York.240
Only two weeks prior to the deadline for making a $261 million payment on the arbitral
award rendered against it, however, Pertamina filed an action in the Cayman Islands, al-
leging that the original arbitral award was procured by fraud. Pertamina sought damages
in the amount of the award and an injunction preventing KBC from disposing of any
funds received. KBC petitioned the Southern District of New York to enjoin Pertamina
from maintaining the action, and the district court granted the request. The district court
found that the Cayman Island action "ha[d] the obvious purpose of nullifying the judg-
ment[s] of the federal court in Texas .. .[and] the Southern District of New York."'241
The Second Circuit affirmed. It concluded that the requirements for issuance of an
anti-foreign-suit injunction, as set forth in China Trade & Development Corp. v. M.V.
Choong ong,242 were met. Specifically, the court found as a threshold matter that (1) the
parties were the same in both matters; and (2) under the New York Convention, the reso-
lution of the case would be dispositive of the action that was to be enjoined. 243 With
regard to the second finding, the court rejected Pertamina's arguments that the federal
judgments could not be dispositive because the courts of the United States had only sec-
ondary jurisdiction under the New York Convention (i.e., that, as a secondary jurisdiction,
U.S. courts could only confirm and enforce the award-they could not protect judgments
from interference by foreign courts). 244 The Second Circuit concluded that, although
federal courts could not protect a party from all legal hardships associated with foreign
litigation, they "do have inherent power to protect their own judgments from being un-
dermined or vitiated by vexatious litigation in other jurisdictions," and the New York
Convention does not divest them of this power. 245
The appeals court also found that not enjoining the Cayman Islands action would po-
tentially undermine the judgments and jurisdiction of the U.S. courts that had heard and
decided the same issues, and that the foreign action would be vexatious to KBC.246 Fi-
nally, the court concluded that although principles of comity are important to the ques-
tion of whether to impose a foreign anti-suit injunction, "where one court has already
reached a judgment-on the same issues, involving the same parties-considerations of
comity have diminished force." 247 The court affirmed the lower court's judgment but
modified the injunction to clarify that it would not affect confirmation proceedings in
non-U.S. jurisdictions and to permit Pertamina to seek relief from the injunction in the
240. Karaha Bodas Co., L.L.C. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara, 500 F.3d 111
(2d Cir. 2007).
241. Karaha Bodas Co., L.L.C. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara, 465 F.Supp.2d
283, 292-93 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
242. China Trade & Dev. Corp. v. M.V. Choong Yong, 837 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1987).
243. Karaha Bodas Co., 500 F.3d at 122-24.
244. Id. at 124.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 126.
247. Id. at 120 (internal quotations omitted).
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district court if Pertamina could show that it was, in good faith, challenging the award on
grounds of fraud in Switzerland. 248
C. RECOGNWIrION AND ENA'FORCFMENT OF FOREIGN COURT JUDGMENTS
1. Non-Enforcement Based on Repugnance to Public Polity
In Sarl Louis Feraud International v. Viewfinder, Inc., the Second Circuit addressed the
question of whether certain French court judgments violated the public policy of New
York.2 49 Plaintiffs were French fashion designers. The defendant, Delaware corporation
Viewfinder, Inc., operates a website that posts photographs from fashion shows. Plaintiffs
filed suits in January 2001 against Viewfinder in the Tribunal de grande instance de Paris,
alleging unauthorized use of their intellectual property and unfair competition.
Viewfinder did not respond to the complaint, and the French court issued a default judg-
ment against Viewfinder. Viewfinder appealed to the Cour d'appel de Paris in October
2003, but later withdrew its appeal. As a result, the court dismissed the appeal in February
2004.250
Plaintiffs sought to enforce the French judgments in the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York under New York's Uniform Foreign Money Judgment
Recognition Act. 251 The district court granted plaintiffs' request for an order of attach-
ment. In January 2005, Viewfinder filed a motion to dismiss and a motion to vacate the
attachment order, which the district court granted, finding that the judgments were unen-
forceable because they were repugnant to New York's public policy. The court concluded
that Viewfinder had a First Amendment right to publish the photographs, which were
taken of public events. 252 It also found that U.S. copyright law provides for a "fair use"
exception for the publication of newsworthy matters, such as fashion shows. 253 Therefore,
the court concluded that enforcing the judgments would violate the defendant's First
Amendment rights.254
The appeals court considered the Uniform Act, which states that "[a] foreign country
judgment need not be recognized if... the cause of action on which the judgment is based
is repugnant to the public policy of this state."255 The court noted that the standard for
finding that a judgment is repugnant to the state's public policy is a high one, and the
"inquiry rarely results in refusal to enforce a judgment unless it is inherently vicious,
wicked or immoral, and shocking to the prevailing moral sense." 25 6 It is not sufficient, it
found, that the outcome be merely different from that which would have obtained under
U.S. laws or procedures. 257
248. Id. at 130.
249. Sarl Louis Feraud Int'l v. Viewfinder Inc., 489 F.3d 474 (2d Cir. 2007).
250. Id. at 477.
251. N.Y. C.P.L.R. §§ 5301 -09.
252. Sarl Louis Feraud, 489 F.3d at 477-80.
253. Id. at 478.
254. Id.
255. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5304(b)(4).
256. Sarl Louis Feraud, 489 F.3d at 479 (quoting Sung Hwan Co. v. Rite Aid Corp., 7 N.Y.3d 78, 82 (2006)).
257. Id. at 479.
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The appeals court concluded that "[f]oreign judgments that impinge on First Amend-
ment rights will be found to be 'repugnant' to public policy,"25 8 but held that the district
court did not fully analyze whether the intellectual property regime on which the judg-
ments were based impinged on rights protected by the First Amendment. It therefore
vacated the judgment and remanded for further analysis by the district court.259
2. Recognition Based on Principles of International Comity
In deciding the international child abduction case of Navani v. Shahani, the Tenth Cir-
cuit found that the custody order of an English court rendered a parent's appeal of her
case moot.260 Bina Shahani and John Navani shared custody of their son, who habitually
resided in England. Shahani took the child to the United States in violation of the cus-
tody order. In response to Navani's petition that the child be returned to England, the
U.S. District Court for the District of New Mexico ordered the boy's return under the
Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (Hague Con-
vention)261 and the International Child Abduction Remedies Act.262
Shahani appealed. Shortly before oral arguments were heard in the appeal, the English
family court issued a new custody order finding that Shahani unlawfully failed to return
her son to England, granting custody to Navani, and forbidding Shahani to possess or
apply for any passport or travel documents for her son.
In light of this new custody order, the Tenth Circuit dismissed Shahani's appeal as
moot, because the custody order prevented the court from ordering any effective relief to
Shahani.263 Additionally, the court found that general principles of comity require that a
U.S. court give "considerable deference" to a foreign judgment, and that the Hague Con-
vention requires that the courts of the country of the child's habitual residence decide
questions of custody. 264 Furthermore, although the court concluded that "principles of
comity generally require us to examine the fairness of the foreign country's judicial proce-
dures," it rejected the notion that there was any inherent unfairness in the English judicial
system.265
VIII. Forum Non Conveniens*
A. INTRODUCTION
Forum non conveniens is a nonmerits basis for dismissal which allows courts to dismiss
a pending suit for "reasons of convenience, judicial economy, and justice." 266 Generally, a
258. 1d. at 480.
259. Id. at 484.
260. Navani v. Shahani, 496 F.3d 1121 (10th Cir. 2007).
261. Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, 1343
U.N.T.S. 49 (Oct. 25, 1980).
262. International Child Abduction Remedies Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11601-11610 (2007).
263. Navani, 496 F.3d at 1127.
264. Id. at 1128.
265. Id. at 1131.
* Contributed by Phillip Dye, partner, and Justin R. Marlles, associate, at Vinson & Elkins LLP in
Houston, Texas.
266. German Free State of Bavaria v. Toyobo Co., Ltd., 480 F. Supp. 2d 948, 951-52 (W.D. Mich. 2007).
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federal forum non conveniens inquiry involves three key steps.267 First, the district court
must establish the existence of an adequate alternative forum. Second, the court must
determine the level of deference to accord to the plaintiff's choice of forum, with in-
creased deference given to U.S. plaintiffs over foreign plaintiffs. Third, the court must
analyze the balance of private and public interests to determine which forum will be the
most appropriate for the case at hand. Private interest grounds taken into consideration
include: the relative ease of access to sources of proof, the availability of compulsory pro-
cess for attendance of unwilling witnesses, the cost of obtaining attendance of willing wit-
nesses, the possibility of a view of the premises if needed, and any other practical problems
of conducting a trial in the plaintiffs chosen forum.268 Public interest factors weighed by
the courts include: whether trial in the plaintiffs chosen forum imposes administrative
difficulties, whether the burden of jury duty is imposed on a community with no relation
to the litigation, whether the trial furthers the local interest in having localized controver-
sies decided at home, whether a complex choice of law analysis will be necessary, and
whether the case will be tried in the forum at home with the governing law.269 Only when
a district court has taken into account and weighed all of the relevant factors may it grant a
forum non conveniens dismissal 2 70
B. SETrING THE ORDER OF BusINEss: FORUM NON CONVENIENS AND
DETERMINATIONS OF SUBJECT MATTER AND PERSONAL JURISDICTION
By far the most important case to emerge this year dealing with the doctrine of forum
non conveniens is Sinochem Intenrational Co. Ltd. v. Malaysia International Shipping Corp.,
decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in March 2007.271 In Sinochem, the Supreme Court
tackled an issue that had strongly divided the federal circuit courts: "[w]hether a district
court must first conclusively establish its own jurisdiction before dismissing a suit on the
ground offorum non conveniens?" 272 The Third Circuit in Sinochem had held that a federal
district court may not dismiss a case based on the forum non conveniens doctrine "unless
and until it determined definitively that it had both subject-matter jurisdiction over the
cause and personal jurisdiction over the defendant." 273 But other decisions by the Second,
Seventh, and D.C. Circuits took a more pragmatic and less formalistic approach, allowing
for forum non conveniens dismissal before examining personal or subject matter jurisdic-
tion. 274 Recognizing that the need to "resolve a conflict among the Circuits," the Su-
preme Court granted certiorari, reversed the Third Circuit's judgment, and held that
267. See USHA (India), Ltd. v. Honeywell Int'l Inc., 421 F.3d 129, 134 (2d Cir. 2005); LaSala v. UBS, AG,
510 F. Supp. 2d 213, at 218 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
268. See Clough v. Perenco, L.L.C., No. H-05-3713, 2007 WL 2409357 at *3 (S.D. Tex. 2007) (citing Gulf
Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947)).
269. See id. (citing GulfOil Corp., 330 U.S. at 508-09).
270. See LaSala, 510 F. Supp. 2d at 218, 222.
271. See Sinochem Int'l Co., Ltd. v. Malaysia Int'l Shipping Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1184 (2007).
272. Id. at 1188.
273. Id. at 1189 (citing Malaysia Int'l Shipping Corp. v. Sinochem Int'l Co., 436 F.3d 349 (3rd Cir. 2006)).
274. See Intec U.S.A., L.L.C. v. Engle, 467 F.3d 1038 (7th Cir. 2006); Monegasque de Reassurances S.A.M.
(Monde Re) v. NAK Naftogaz of Ukraine, 311 F.3d 488 (2d Cir. 2002); In re Papandreou, 139 F.3d 247
(D.C. Cir. 1998).
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"forum non conveniens may justify dismissal of an action though jurisdictional issues remain
unresolved. 275
The Court, quoting the Seventh Circuit in Intec, reasoned that determining jurisdiction
"is vital only if the court proposes to issue a judgment on the merits." 276 Yet, looking to its
earlier 1999 opinion in Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., it established that a forum non
conveniens dismissal is anything but a judgment on the merits.2 77 According to the Court,
"[t]he critical point here, rendering a forum non conveniens determination a threshold,
nonmerits issue in the relevant context, is simply this: Resolving a forum non conveniens
motion does not entail any assumption by the court of substantive 'law-declaring
power'." 278
Notably, the Court also distanced itself from its remark in GulfOil that "the doctrine of
forum non conveniens can never apply if there is an absence of jurisdiction," 279 comment-
ing that the statements from Gulf Oil were carelessly crafted.28°
Ultimately, the Supreme Court held that the unique facts of each case will determine
whether forum non conveniens motions will be heard before jurisdictional issues.281 This
mandate for pragmatism has been seamlessly accepted by the federal district courts, with
trial courts coming down on both sides of the question. For example, in Vivendi, S.A. v.
T-Mobile USA, Inc., the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington held
that "[b]ecause it may be dispositive in this case, the court intends to address the issue of
forum non conveniens before reaching any alterative ground for dismissal." 82 On the other
hand, the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey in First Colonial Insurance Co.
v. Custom Flooring, Inc. found that "subject matter jurisdiction [could] be readily deter-
mined" and thus declined to rule on the defendant's motion for forum non conveniens
dismissal.283
C. FORUM NON CONVENIENS AND DOCKET CONGESTION
In 2007, courts in the Sixth and Seventh Circuits reached substantially different deci-
sions regarding the effect of locally congested dockets and the administrative hassles of a
full-blown jury trial on forum non conveniens dismissal.2 84 These considerations are
hardly unknown to federal courts conducting the public interest prong of the forum non
coveniens analysis, since the Court in GulfOil Corp. declared that "[a]dministrative diffi-
culties follow for courts when litigation is piled up in congested centers instead of being
handled at its origin" and that "[jiury duty is a burden that ought not to be imposed upon
275. Sinochem, 127 S. Ct. at 1190.
276. Id. at 1191-92 (quoting Intec USA., L.L.C., 467 F.3d at 1041).
277. See id. at 1192 (quoting Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574 (1999)).
278. Id. at 1192-93 (quoting In re Papandreou, 139 F.3d at 255).
279. Id. at 1193 (quoting GulfOil Corp., 330 U.S. at 504).
280. Id. at 1193.
281. See id. at 1194.
282. Vivendi, SA v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. C06-1524JLR, 2007 WL 1168819 at *2 (W.D. Wash. 2007).
283. First Colonial Ins. Co. v. Custom Flooring, Inc., No. Civ. A 06-3998 NLH, 2007 WL 1175759 at *3
(D.N.J. 2007).
284. See In re Factor VIII or IX Concentrate Blood Products Litig., 484 F.3d 951, 958-59 (7th Cir. 2007);
German Free State of Bavaria v. Toyobo Co., Ltd., 480 F. Supp. 2d 948, 955 (W.D. Mich. 2007).
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the people of a community which has no relation to the litigation." 28 5 The Seventh Cir-
cuit Court and the Western District of Michigan, however, appear to have diverged in
their .opinions as to whetherthese elements constitute separate factors from the broader
public interest concern of "having localized controversies decided at home," in addition to
the overall weight to be accorded to matters of docket congestion. 28 6
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in In re Factor VIII or IX Concentrate Blood Prod-
ucts Litigation dealt with these two issues in a case involving British plaintiffs who con-
tracted HIV through tainted blood products.28 7 In reviewing the decision of the district
court to grant forum non conveniens dismissal, the Seventh Circuit stated that the lower
court "may have over-estimated the administrative difficulties in keeping the case in the
United States."288 Echoing the language of the Ninth Circuit in Gates Learjet Corp. v.
Jensen, the Seventh Circuit opined that "[t]heforum non conveniens doctrine should not be
used as a solution to court congestion. '289 Attacking the lower court's decision to dismiss
based on the plaintiff's ability to pursue a complex and time-consuming jury trial in the
United States, the court declared that "the fact that a plaintiff may exercise her constitu-
tional right to a jury trial is not something that properly may weigh against keeping a case
in the United States."290 Crucially, the Seventh Circuit held that "[i]n our view, the bur-
dens of jury duty are closely linked with the local interest in the litigation; they are not a
separate reason to reject a case." 29 1
The District Court for the Western District of Michigan in German Free State of Bava-
ria v. Toyobo Co., Ltd. reached a very different conclusion as to the importance assigned in a
forum non conveniens analysis to a possible jury trial in a district with an already crowded
docket. 292 Unlike the Seventh Circuit, the Michigan district court found that the undue
burden placed on a Michigan jury to try a case with no substantial connection to Michigan
constituted an independent factor militating forum non conveniens dismissal under the
Gilbert public interest test.293 Furthermore, the district court noted in granting forum
non conveniens dismissal "that this District is in fact in a 'judicial crisis' as it has been
awaiting the appointment of three federal judges for quite some time with no indication
that such appointments will be made any time in the near future."294 Of course, all this is
a far cry from the Seventh and Ninth Circuits' determination that "[t]he forum non con-
veniens doctrine should not be used as a solution to court congestion." 295
285. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 508-09.
286. Id. at 509.
287. See In re Factor VIII, 484 F.3d at 952-54.
288. Id. at 953-54.
289. Id. at 959 (quoting Gates Learjet Corp. v. Jensen, 743 F.2d 1325, 1337 (9th Cir. 1984)).
290. Id. at 958.
291. Id. at 959.
292. See Toyobo Co., Ltd., 480 F. Supp. 2d at 955.
293. See id. at 954-55. See also Clough, 2007 WL 2409537 at *5 (listing "[wlhether the burden of jury duty is
imposed on a community with no relation to the litigation" as an independent public interest factor for forum
non conveniens dismissal).
294. Toyobo Co., Ltd., 480 F. Supp. 2d at 955.
295. In re Factor VIII, 484 F.3d at 959; Gates Learjet Corp., 743 F.2d at 1337.
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D. FORUM NON CONVENIENS AND ESTOPPEL
Finally, in 2007, two new cases emerged clarifying the relationship between forum non
conveniens and the equitable doctrine of estoppel. In both rulings, federal courts were
faced with the question of how previous forum non conveniens determinations affected
pending requests for forum non conveniens dismissal. The Third Circuit Court of Ap-
peals was the first to confront the matter in Davis International, LLC v. New Start Group
Corp., where the district court dismissed a complaint as directly estopped on the grounds
that forum non conveniens dismissal had already been granted in an earlier related action
and that "the doctrine of direct estoppel barred Appellants from relitigating the decision
against them."296 Affirming the district court's decision, the Third Circuit determined
that the present complaint and the previous complaint, upon which forum non conveniens
dismissal was granted, were "identical in all material respects." 297 The Third Circuit,
highlighting the reversal of its previous decision in Sinochem by the U.S. Supreme Court,
additionally rejected the plaintiff-appellant's argument that "the District Court erred in
deciding the direct estoppel issue before it determined its jurisdiction." 298
The District Court for the Southern District of New York in In re Ski Train Fire in
Kaprun, Austria on November 11, 2000299 also explored the nexus between estoppel and
forum non conveniens in the context of collateral, rather than direct, estoppel. 300 This
decision, involving consolidated cases brought by plaintiffs from Germany, Austria, Japan,
and Slovenia, was part of a larger series of cases filed by various U.S. and foreign dece-
dents of those who died in a disastrous ski train fire at a holiday resort in Austria. 30' The
plaintiffs argued that the refusal of a district court to grant forum non conveniens dismis-
sal in a prior case originating from the ski train disaster collaterally estopped the defend-
ants from moving for forum non conveniens dismissal in In re Ski Train Fire.302 The trial
court refused to accept the plaintiffs' estoppel argument, explaining that "[t]he prior pro-
ceeding underpinning plaintiffs' collateral estoppel claim is a previous decision by this
Court denying a motion to dismiss the U.S. plaintiffs' . . . cases for forum non con-
veniens."30 3 Because the plaintiffs in the previously decided Austrian ski fire case were
American citizens, while the plaintiffs in the In re Ski Train Fire actions were not, the
court felt that the issues before it were not "identical to those previously litigated" and
thus declined to hold the forum non conveniens motion as collaterally estopped. 304 In
particular, the decision by the district court in In re Ski Train Fire underlines the continu-
ing power and vitality of the U.S. Supreme Court's holding in Piper Aircraft Co. that a
"distinction between resident or citizen plaintiffs and foreign plaintiffs is fully justified"
296. Davis Int'l, LLC v. New Start Group Corp., 488 F.3d 597, 600 (3d Cir. 2007).
297. Id. at 604.
298. Id.
299. See In re Ski Train Fire, 499 F. Supp. 2d 437, 444 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
300. Issue preclusion through collateral estoppel applies to different claims, while issue preclusion through
direct estoppel applies to "successive prosecutions of the same claim." See 50 CJ.S. Judgment § 781 (1997).
301. See In re Ski Train Fire, 499 F. Supp. 2d at 440.
302. See id. at 444.
303. Id.
304. Id.
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and that "plaintiff's choice of forum is entitled to greater deference when the plaintiff has
chosen the home forum." 305
IX. Choice of Law*
A. CHOICE OF LAW AND THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR
THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS
In The Travelers Property Casualty Co. v. Saint-Gobain Technical Fabrics Canada Ltd., the
United States District Court for the District of Minnesota determined that the United
Nations Convention for the International Sale of Goods (CISG) governed the formation
of a contract between a Minnesota firm and a Canadian firm, even though a choice of law
clause in the purchase order referred to Minnesota law.306
A liability insurer and general contractor sued Saint -Gobain, a Canadian corporation,
to recover amounts paid in settlement after Saint-Gobain supplied faulty materials to the
contractor for a construction project.307 As an alternative ground for their motion for
partial summary judgment, the plaintiffs asserted that the CISG governed formation of
the contract. 308 The plaintiffs argued that the CISG was relevant to finding that the in-
demnification and express warranties of the purchase order formed part of the contract
between the contractor and Saint-Gobain; 309 however, Saint-Gobain argued that Minne-
sota law governed because the purchase order referenced Minnesota law and, therefore,
the Minnesota Uniform Commercial Code applied. 310
Citing to Asante Technologies, Inc. v. PMC-Sierra, Inc.,311 and Article VI of the United
States Constitution, the district court determined that the CISG should govern. The
court noted that states are bound by the Supremacy Clause to the treaties of the United
States.312 The court held that because the United States has ratified the CISG treaty, and
Minnesota is a territory within the United States, the CISG applies to the contract absent
an express statement in the purchase order otherwise. 313 Although the court determined
that the CISG was applicable, it elected not to address the interpretation of the indemnifi-
cation and express warranties clauses until it had more facts. 314
305. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 255-56 (1981). See also Sinocbem, 127 S. Ct. at 1191 (con-
firming the validity of Piper Aircraft).
* Contributed by Dawna B. Gardner, Trademark Examining Attorney, U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office; Adjunct Professor of Legal Rhetoric: Writing and Research, American University Washington
College of Law. The views expressed are those of the author and not necessarily those of the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office or the United States Government.
306. Travelers Prop. Cas. Co. v. Saint-Gobain Technical Fabrics Can. Ltd., 474 F. Supp 2d 1075, 1081 (D.
Minn. 2007).
307. Id.
308. Id. at 1081.
309. Id.
310. Id.
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B. CHOICE OF LAW AND LOST OR DAMAGED FREIGHT
In Eli Lilly Do Brasil, Ltda. v. Federal Express Corp., the Second Circuit determined that
federal common law and not Brazilian law applied to a claim based upon the transporta-
tion of cargo. 315 Eli Lilly had a contract with Federal Express (FedEx) to ship
pharmaceuticals from Brazil to Japan. 316 The waybill for shipment limited FedEx's liabil-
ity for stolen goods. 317 Lilly had the option to secure additional coverage by declaring a
higher value and paying additional fees. 318 Lily, however, did not exercise its option. 319
The shipment was hijacked, and $800,000 worth of cargo was stolen. 320
To recover the loss, Lilly sued FedEx in the Southern District of New York.321 FedEx
moved to limit its liability based on federal common law, but Lilly believed that Brazilian
law applied. 322 The court ruled that federal common law was the substantive law, not the
law of Brazil. Thus, the waybill was valid. 323 Lilly appealed.
On appeal, the Second Circuit conducted a federal common law choice-of-law analysis
to determine whether the laws of Brazil or U.S. federal common law should govern the
dispute. Referring to the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, the court recognized
the presumption that the law of the jurisdiction having the greatest interest in the litiga-
tion should be applied.324 The court determined that, under this presumption, Brazil had
a more significant relationship to the parties and the contract because the contract to ship
goods from Brazil to Japan was negotiated in Brazil between a Brazilian company and a
U.S. company and thus had greater contacts than the United States under Section 188 of
the Restatement. 325
The court did not end its inquiry there, however. The court went on to examine
whether the United States nonetheless had a greater interest in the litigation. The court
reasoned that the rule favoring the local law from where the goods were dispatched may
not apply when the contract would be invalid under that law but valid under the law of
another state with a close relationship to the parties and the contract. 326 Because the
waybill would be valid under federal common law and not Brazilian law, the Court deter-
mined that federal common law applied. 327 Such a finding, the court concluded, was con-
sistent with the reasonable expectations of the parties regarding the contract. Lilly had
the option to insure the cargo for additional fees. However, Lilly elected not to pay for
more insurance. Thus, according to the court, the obligations and options of the waybill
contract between two sophisticated parties, was enforceable under federal common law,
not Brazilian law. 328
315. Eli Lilly Do Brasil, Ltda. v. Fed. Express Corp., 502 F.3d 78 (2d Cir. 2007).
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